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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article examines situations in which the common law doctrine of 
necessity justifies violating property rights in order to avert a greater danger 
or produce a greater good.  There are two broad areas in this topic—private 
necessity and public necessity.  Private necessity involves the actions of pri-
vate individuals who destroy, use or consume the property of others, with-
out permission or over their objections.1  Private necessity involves the 
need to protect the actor’s own property, that of a third party, or to protect 
life and limb of the actor or others.2  The hallmark of private necessity is 
that the action is done for the purpose of preserving only the interest of the 
actor or some third party, rather than the public at large.3 
Public necessity pertains to action taken by public authorities or private 
individuals to avert a public calamity.4  The action consists in destroying or 
appropriating another’s property.5  The classic example of public necessity 
is the destruction of private property to prevent the spread of fire6 or dis-
ease,7 and hence to avert an injury to the public at large.  Public necessity is 
in operation where the police trespass on or damage private property in 
order to apprehend a criminal suspect or gain access to the site of an emer-
gency.8  The principle behind public necessity is that the law regards the 
welfare of the public as superior to the interests of individuals and, when 
there is a conflict between them, the latter must give way.9 
Glanville Williams expressed the necessity doctrine in the following 
way: “[S]ome acts that would otherwise be wrong are rendered rightful by a 
 
1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (8th ed. 2004) (defining private necessity); see also 
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Company, 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (discussed in Part 
II.A infra). 
2. RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS § 197 (1965) (Private Necessity). 
3. Id. 
4. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1059 (8th ed. 2004) (defining public necessity); see also 
Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 69 (Cal. 1853) (discussed in Part III.D infra). 
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 204 (Entry to Arrest for Criminal Offense) 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (Public Necessity). 
6. See, e.g., Surocco, 3 Cal. at 71; Conwell v. Emrie, 2 Ind. 35, 35 (1850); Field v. City of 
Des Moines, 39 Ia. 575, 575 (1874); Hale v. Lawrence, 21 N.J. L. 714, 714 (N.J. 1848); Keller v. 
City of Corpus Christi, 50 Tex. 614, 614 (1879).  See generally Joseph H. Beale, Note, 
Justification for Injury, 41 HARV. L. REV. 553 (1928). 
7. Seavy v. Preble, 64 Me. l20 (l874). 
8. See, e.g., United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1991) (stating that necessity 
is “a utilitarian defense” based on “maximizing social welfare . . . where the social benefits of the 
crime outweigh the social costs of failing  to commit the crime”); see also David L. Shapiro, The 
Case of the Speluncean Exploreers: A Fiftieth Anniversary Symposium, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1834, 
1914 (1999) (“Like all of the lesser-evil justifications, necessity is openly utilitarian.”). 
9. See City of Durham v. Eno Cotton Mills, 54 S.E. 453, 464 (1906). 
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good purpose, or by the necessity of choosing the lesser of two evils.”10  
Williams offers this example: 
Suppose that a dike threatens to give way, and the actor is faced 
with the choice of either making a breach in the dike, which he 
knows will result in one or two people being drowned, or doing 
nothing, in which case he knows that the dike will burst at another 
point involving a whole town in sudden destruction.  In such a sit-
uation, where there is an unhappy choice between the destruction 
of one life and the destruction of many, utilitarian philosophy 
would certainly justify the actor in preferring the lesser evil.11 
Another commentator observed: 
[T]hese [justified] acts are ones, as regard which, upon balancing 
all considerations of public policy, it seems desirable that they 
should be encouraged and commended even though in each case 
some individual may be injured or the result may be otherwise not 
wholly to be desired.12 
The necessity doctrine “represents a concession to human weakness in 
cases of extreme pressure, where the accused breaks the law rather than 
submitting to the probability of greater harm if he does not break the law.”13  
English and American courts have long recognized necessity as a common 
law principle, even in the absence of statutory law on the subject.14  Today 
many states have enacted varying forms of a statutory necessity defense.15 
With the necessity defense there will always be a prima facie violation 
of the law.  For purposes of this article, the violation will consist of tres-
pass, conversion or other kinds of infringement of property rights.  Under 
the necessity doctrine, there is a weighing of interests: the act of invasion of 
another’s property is justified under the necessity doctrine only if done to 
protect or advance some private or public interest of a value greater than, or 
at least equal to, that of the interest invaded.  The policy rationale is that 
 
10. GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 198 (Alfred A. 
Knopf, Inc. 1957). 
11. Id. at 190-200. 
12. JUSTIN MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 189 (West Publishing Co. 1934). 
13. A. J. Ashworth, Reason, Logic and Criminal Liability, 91 L. Q. REV. 102, 106 (1975). 
14. Edward B. Arnolds & Norman F. Garland, The Defense of Necessity in Criminal Law: 
The Right to Choose the Lesser Evil, 65 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 289, 291-96 (1974). 
15. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.320 (LexisNexis 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-604 
(West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-702 (West 2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 463 
(2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-302 (LexisNexis 2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 503.030 
(LexisNexis 2003); MO. ANN. STAT. § 563.026 (West 2004); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-2 (West 
2004); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (McKinney 2004); TEX. PENAL CODE § 9.22 (Vernon 2004); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.47 (West 2003). 
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society as a whole has no interest in the invasion of property rights unless 
the good which is intended to result is greater than, or at least equal to, the 
harm that it is likely to cause. 
A major issue associated with both private and public necessity is 
whether compensation is owed to the aggrieved party whose property is 
damaged, appropriated or destroyed.  In cases involving both private and 
public necessity, there is no liability for the technical tort, be it trespass or 
conversion.  However, in cases of private necessity, for the most part actors 
are considered to have an “incomplete” or “partial” privilege so that the 
aggrieved party is entitled to compensation for the damage done.  With re-
gard to public necessity, the general rule is that no compensation is owed, 
but there are numerous exceptions. 
This article first examines private necessity, and a variety of situations 
in which actors have trespassed on land or committed acts of conversion in 
necessitous circumstances are considered.  Among other things, situations 
involving the loss of control of automobiles, the special situation of aviation 
emergency landings, and acts in diverting harm from the actor to a third 
party are discussed.  The larger part of the article focuses on public neces-
sity, especially cases involving trespass or conversion on the part of the 
military in time of war.  Then the focus turns to other instances of the inva-
sion of property rights based on public necessity, including emergencies 
such as preventing a fire from spreading, preventing the spread of disease, 
and actions by the police in apprehending criminal suspects.  The issue of 
whether aggrieved parties are legally entitled to compensation will be 
considered throughout the article. 
II. VIOLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS BASED ON PRIVATE 
NECESSITY 
A. TRESPASS TO PREVENT SERIOUS HARM TO ONESELF, ONE’S 
LAND, THIRD PARTIES, OR ONE’S CHATTELS 
There is a general sense in the doctrine of necessity that one has the 
qualified privilege to intentionally trespass onto the land of another in order 
to prevent serious harm to oneself, to one’s own land, to one’s chattels, or 
to the person, land, or chattels of another.  However, compensation must 
ordinarily be paid for any harm done in the process. 
No one would have any qualms about justifying the action of the 
proverbial backpacker who, in the stress of weather and being lost in the 
wilderness, comes upon an unoccupied cabin, enters it, and partakes of 
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foodstuff and shelter.16  It seems intuitive, as well, that the backpacker 
should be required to compensate the occupant for the food so consumed.  
All the more so, if the backpacker was reckless in getting stranded or in 
failing to take provisions that would probably be associated with a 
backpacking venture.  This principle is set forth in section 197 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts (Private Necessity): 
(1) One is privileged to enter or remain on land in the possession 
of another if it is or reasonably appears to be necessary to prevent 
serious harm to: 
(a) the actor, or his land or chattels, or 
(b) the other or a third person, or the land or chattels of either, 
unless the actor knows or has reason to know that the one for 
whose benefit he enters is unwilling that he shall take such 
action. 
(2) Where the entry is for the benefit of the actor or a third person, 
he is subject to liability for any harm done in the exercise of the 
privilege stated in Subsection (1) to any legally protected interest 
of the possessor in the land or connected with it, except where the 
threat of harm to avert which the entry is made is caused by the 
tortious conduct or contributory negligence of the possessor.17 
The Comment to this section states that when necessary to prevent 
serious harm, a person is privileged “to break and enter or to destroy a fence 
or other enclosure and indeed a building, including a dwelling.”18  How-
ever, “more may be required to justify [entering a dwelling] than . . . entry 
upon other premises”19 and this is “a fact to be taken into account in 
determining the reasonableness of the defendant’s action[s].”20  Thus, one 
might be justified in breaking into someone’s barn under a set of circum-
stances that would fail to justify breaking into the dwelling.  The Comment 
also states: “[I]t may be reasonable for the actor to break through a fence in 
order to rescue his dog who is drowning in the plaintiff’s pond, where it 
would not be reasonable for him to break into the plaintiff’s dwelling in 
order to release the same dog from temporary confinement.”21 
 
16. See Joel Feinberg, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life, 7 PHIL. & 
PUB. AFFAIRS 93, 97 (1978) (discussing the connection between the right to life and human well-
being). 
17. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS § 197 (1965). 
18. Id. cmt. g. 
19. Id. cmt. h. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
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What if, in the backpacker case, the cabin reasonably appears 
unoccupied but in fact is actually occupied?  What if the occupant objects to 
the intrusion?  Does the backpacker have a right, based in necessity, to use 
reasonable force to gain entry and to take food from the cabin, over the 
objection of the occupant?  The Restatement addresses this concern as 
follows: “[T]he privilege . . . carries with it the subsidiary privilege to use 
reasonable force to the person of the possessor or any third person.”22  
However, “[d]irect authority is lacking as to the subsidiary privilege to use 
force against the person, or to break or enter an enclosure or a building. . . 
[but that] to render the privilege of entry effective the subsidiary privilege is 
obviously necessary.”23  In an emergency one might well use force against 
an objecting possessor, and worry about the consequences later.  For 
instance, if my dog is drowning in a neighbor’s pool, I would likely run 
down the side of my neighbor’s house towards the backyard, and then jump 
over the fence to save my dog.  If, as it happens, my neighbor blocks my 
passage (perhaps the neighbor is unaware of the nature of the emergency 
and there is no time to explain), I will likely use reasonable force to push 
past the occupant, and explain later.  If I were charged with trespass and 
assault and battery, the Restatement view would justify the action based on 
the necessity doctrine.  I would, however, be liable to pay for damages 
associated with the trespass, such as costs to replace or repair a broken 
fence, or damages to my neighbor’s flowerbed.  It would also seem consis-
tent with the Restatement position to impose liability for any damages 
associated with the assault, such as medical costs. 
In Rossi v. Del Duca,24 the plaintiff, a child, was walking home from 
school, when a large dog chased her down the street.25  In order to protect 
herself from harm, she cut across a field to the rear of the defendant’s house 
in an effort to escape from the dog chasing her and to get home.26  How-
ever, another dog, owned by the defendant, proceeded to attack and injured 
her.27  The girl sued for damages under a Massachusetts law that imposed 
strict liability on the owner or keeper of any dog that does damage to the 
body or property of any person.28  The statute made an exception for in-
stances where a person at the time such damage was sustained, committed a 
 
22. Id. cmt. g. 
23. Id.  Reporter’s notes to § 197 cmt. g. 
24. 81 N.E.2d 591 (Mass. 1962). 
25. Rossi, 81 N.E.2d at 592. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 593 (internal citation omitted). 
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trespass.29  The evidence clearly showed that the plaintiff was trespassing 
on defendant’s property when the dog attacked her.30  However, the court, 
citing section 197 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, held that the plaintiff 
had a privilege to enter the land because it reasonably appeared to be neces-
sary to prevent serious harm from occurring to her.31  “This privilege not 
only relieves the intruder from liability for technical trespass but it also 
destroys the possessor’s immunity from liability in resisting the intru-
sion.”32  Thus, the court noted that this privilege to enter the land means 
that the possessor of the land is under a duty to permit that person to come 
onto and remain there, and is not privileged to block the actor from 
proceeding with the necessitous conduct.33 
In Depue v. Flateu,34 the plaintiff was invited into the defendant’s 
house, and while there, he was taken suddenly ill and fell to the floor.35  He 
requested permission to remain overnight, but defendants refused.36  The 
defendants assisted him from their house to the cutter.37  Plaintiff could not 
hold the reins to guide his team, and one of the defendants threw the reins 
over his shoulders, and started the team upon the road.38 
The plaintiff, who nearly froze to death, sued for damages.  The court 
noted that the plaintiff was in the defendants’ house by invitation.39  He was 
temporarily their guest.40  The court issued a ruling noting the 
comprehensive principle that whenever a person is placed in such 
a position with regard to another that it is obvious that, if he does 





32. Id. at 593-94.  The court quoted the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 197, comment k 
(Tent. draft no. 2, 1958), on this point: 
The important difference between the status of one who is a trespasser on land and one 
who is on the land pursuant to an incomplete privilege is that the latter is entitled to be 
on the land and therefore the possessor of the land is under a duty to permit him to 
come and remain there and hence is not privileged to resist. 
Id. 
33. The drafters of the Restatement (Second) of Torts take the view that the possessor of land 
or chattel has no right to use reasonable force to defend his exclusive possession, in cases of 
necessity.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 263, cmt. b (1965). 
34. 111 N.W. 1 (Minn. 1907). 
35. Depue, 111 N.W. at 1. 
36. Id. at 2. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 3. 
40. Id. 
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person, the duty at once arises to exercise care commensurate with 
the situation in which he thus finds himself.41 
The defendants thus violated a legal duty towards their guest when they 
turned him out of their house in a winter night and left him to his fate.42 
Illustration 4 to section 197 of Restatement (Second) of Torts, echoes 
the Depue case: 
On a very cold winter night A, visiting at B’s dwelling, is over-
come by an attack of illness which leaves him helpless and unable 
to take care of himself.  A is privileged without liability to remain 
in B’s house until arrangements can be made to take him to a place 
where he will not be exposed to danger from the weather.43 
In Currie v. Silvernale,44 the defendant made unauthorized entry upon 
plaintiff’s land, claiming necessity in an emergency to save his own prop-
erty.45  The plaintiff sued for trespass and for injunctive relief to prevent 
further trespasses.46  The defendant claimed that he entered the plaintiff’s 
land so as to block the formation of a channel that would have prevented 
water from flowing into defendant’s millpond, and would have thus 
 
41. Id. at 2. 
42. Id. at 3.  Of similar import, see Texas Midland R. R. Co. v. Geraldon, 117 S.W. 1004, 
1007-08 (Tex. 1909), in which the court held that the inconvenience in keeping a railway station 
open was not sufficient to justify turning out into a storm, far from any shelter, a woman who had 
missed her train and was waiting out the storm in the waiting room until the next train left the 
following morning. 
 According to Bohlen: 
It is clear that a railway company may not eject even a “hobo,” stealing a ride on its 
through express, while the train is going at fifty miles an hour, although this involves a 
toleration of his presence on the train until it reaches the next stop; and a captain of a 
vessel is not privileged to make a stowaway, discovered in mid-ocean, walk the plank, 
although he would be privileged to force him to leave the vessel by the same plank if it 
were a gangway to a dock. 
Francis H. Bohlen, Incomplete Privilege to Inflict Intentional Invasions of Interests of Property 
and Personality, 39 HARV. L. REV. 307, 311 n.7 (1926). 
 Of similar import, see Bradshaw v. Frazier, 85 N.W. 752 (Ia. 1901), in which the court held 
that a judgment of eviction to oust a holdover tenant “could not be lawfully executed if a member 
of the tenant’s family was so ill that his removal would endanger his life.”  Bohlen, supra note 42, 
at 311.  This is subject, however, to the proviso that his continued presence is not likely to cause 
the occupiers of other premises in the building to acquiring a contagious disease.  Id. 
 A similar holding occurred in Tucker v. Burt, 115 N.W. 722 (Mich. 1908), in which a janitor 
who was entitled to occupy an apartment during his employment, was discharged.  Id.  It was held 
that a member of his family, who was ill with a contagious disease and whose removal was 
dangerous, could be removed if the interest of the occupiers of the other premises in their bodily 
security outweighed the janitor’s family member’s interests.  Id. 
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197, illus. 4 (1965). 
44. 171 N.W. 782 (Minn. 1919). 
45. Currie, 171 N.W. at 784. 
46. Id. 
      
660 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:651 
destroyed the usefulness of defendant’s dam.47  The defendant constructed 
an embankment on plaintiff’s land with rocks and dirt so as to prevent over-
flow from forming new channels.48  It was the defendant’s purpose to main-
tain the natural spillway so that the efficiency of defendant’s dam would not 
become impaired.49 
The court noted that an unauthorized entry upon the lands of another to 
save private property may be justified in an emergency.50  The court said 
that it may well be that the “unexpected opening of a new channel” was 
such an emergency that threatened the destruction of the defendant’s water 
power, and that this could justify entering plaintiff’s property to preserve 
the water flow.51  This entry not only saved the defendant’s water flow, but 
also averted the erosion to plaintiff’s property, and thus was beneficial to 
both parties.52  However, the facts of the case indicated that following the 
initial trespass, the defendant made repeated entries onto plaintiff’s land to 
make repairs.53  The court concluded that these repeated entries must be re-
garded as trespass or a wrongful invasion of plaintiff’s premises, but that 
the appropriate remedy would be nominal damages and an injunction for-
bidding further trespasses.54 
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.55 is a classic tort case decided 
in 1910 by the Minnesota Supreme Court.  The case was somewhat of a 
cause celebre in its day and generated critical comments in several law 
review articles.56  The facts of the case are as follows: A ship’s captain kept 
his vessel, the steamship Reynolds, moored to a dock after its cargo had 
been offloaded rather than risk losing the ship in a very severe storm.57  The 
storm developed during the unloading process, and by the time the un-
loading was completed, winds were at fifty miles per hour.58  The storm 
continued to increase in intensity as the night went on.59  The captain tried 
to get a tug to tow the ship from the dock, but no tug could be obtained 
 
47. Id. at 783. 
48. Id. 
49. Id. 





55. 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910). 
56. E.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 157 (1973); 
George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537, 546 (1972); 
George P. Fletcher,The Search for Synthesis in Tort Theory, 2 L. & PHIL. 63, 65 (1983). 
57. Vincent, 124 N.W. at 221. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. 
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because of the storm.60  Those in charge of the vessel were therefore con-
fronted with the following choice of evils: either keep the vessel moored 
fast to the dock with the obvious certainty of injuring the dock, or permit 
the boat to drift away into a tempest in circumstances that would in all 
probability render the boat unmanageable.61  The captain opted to keep the 
lines fastened to the dock, and “as soon as one parted or chafed it was 
replaced, sometimes with a larger one.”62  The winds and waves struck the 
Reynolds with such force “that she was constantly being lifted and thrown 
against the dock,” causing damage that the jury found in the amount of 
$500.63 
The Minnesota Supreme Court held the master was justified in keeping 
his ship tied to the dock during the storm.64  The court commented that it 
would have been highly imprudent for the captain to attempt to leave the 
dock or to have permitted his vessel to drift away from it.65  The court 
added that while “the situation was one in which the ordinary rules 
regulating property rights were suspended by forces beyond human 
control,” 
those in charge of the vessel deliberately and by their direct efforts 
held her in such a position that the damage to the dock resulted, 
and, having thus preserved the ship at the expense of the dock, it 
seems to us that her owners are responsible to the dock owners to 
the extent of the injury inflicted.66 
The court also stated: 
Theologians hold that a starving man may, without moral guilt, 
take what is necessary to sustain life; but it could hardly be said 
that the obligation would not be upon such a person to pay the 
value of the property so taken when he became able to do so.  And 
so public necessity, in times of war or peace, may require the 
taking of private property for public purposes; but under our 








64. Id. at 222. 
65. Id. at 221. 
66. Id. at 222. 
67. Id. 
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Finally, the court concluded: 
This is not a case where life or property was menaced by any 
object or thing belonging to the plaintiff, the destruction of which 
became necessary to prevent the threatened disaster, nor is it a case 
where, because of the act of God, or unavoidable accident, the 
infliction of the injury was beyond the control of the defendant, 
but is one where the defendant prudently and advisedly availed 
itself of the plaintiff’s property for the purpose of preserving its 
own more valuable property. . . .68 
The court cited with approval Ploof v. Putnam,69 in which a Vermont 
court held the owner of a dock liable for damages to a shipowner for un-
mooring a vessel that had sought refuge in a storm, thereby casting it back 
into the storm.70  The plaintiff in Ploof was sailing with his family in his 
sloop upon Lake Champlain, and was overtaken by a violent tempest which 
threatened to swamp his boat.71  The plaintiff was faced with the following 
choice of evils: either to trespass by mooring the boat to a private dock 
owned by the defendant, without permission, and thereby prevent destruc-
tion of his boat and of the lives of its occupants; or to remain upon the lake 
in the midst of the storm.  The plaintiff decided to trespass on the private 
dock, and secured it with mooring.72  However, the defendant’s employee 
promptly unmoored the vessel, which was cast upon the opposite shore by 
the tempest, with the result that “the sloop and its contents were thereby 
destroyed, and the plaintiff and his wife and children [were] cast into the 
lake and upon the shore, receiving injuries.”73  The complaint charged the 
defendant alternatively with trespass and negligence.74  The plaintiff argued 
that it was the duty of the defendant to allow the plaintiff to moor his sloop 
to the dock and to permit it to remain so moored during the continuance of 
the storm.75  The court held for the plaintiff, finding the defendant respon-
sible for damages because his employee unmoored the vessel, permitting it 
to drift upon the shore, with resultant injuries to it.76 
The Vincent court commented that in the Ploof case, if “the vessel had 
been permitted to remain, and the dock had suffered an injury, we believe 
 
68. Id. 
69. 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908). 
70. Ploof, 71 A. at 188-89. 
71. Id. at 188. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 189. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 190. 
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the shipowner would have been held liable for the injury done.”77  The 
Vincent case holds for the idea that a shipowner can unilaterally appropriate 
a dock in necessitous circumstances, provided he pays for its damages.  In 
other words, there is a “qualified” necessity in that the action, while justi-
fied under the necessity doctrine, nonetheless entails paying compensation 
for damages occasioned by the trespass.78 
The Vincent court tried to distinguish the facts of its case from injuries 
to a dock caused by an act of God, which would not result in liability for 
damages.79  The court concluded: 
[H]ad the ship entered the harbor, and while there had become 
disabled and been thrown against the plaintiffs’ dock, the plaintiffs 
could not have recovered.  Again, if while attempting to hold fast 
to the dock the lines had parted, without any negligence, and the 
vessel carried against some other boat or dock in the harbor, there 
would be no liability upon her owner.80 
While the storm, in itself, was an act of God, the damage to the dock 
was not.  That is, the Vincent court seemed to focus on the fact that the 
cables attached from the boat to the dock had given way, and that the 
master of the ship reattached new cables to keep the boat from being cast 
adrift.  The opinion seems to rest on the fact that the master reattached the 
ship, using stronger cables, after the initial mooring got dislodged during 
the storm.  This reconfiguring the moorings with the stronger cables disso-
ciated the incident from being an act of God.  The master had the right to 
renew his cables, but in doing so he was required to compensate the dock 
owner for the damages.81 
The Vincent case suggests that if the ship had not completed dis-
charging her cargo, so that her license to use the dock had still been in 
effect, or if the captain had not reattached the vessel to the dock with fresh 
cables after her moorings broke, the case might be decided as one of an act 
of God, and no liability would have been imposed. 
The dissenting judge in Vincent declared: 
[I]f the boat was lawfully in position at the time the storm broke, 
and the master could not, in the exercise of due care, have left that 
position without subjecting his vessel to the hazards of the storm, 
then the damage to the dock, caused by the pounding of the boat, 
 
77. Id. at 222. 




      
664 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:651 
was the result of an inevitable accident.  If the master was in the 
exercise of due care, he was not at fault.  The reasoning of the 
opinion admits that if the ropes, or cables, first attached to the 
dock had not parted, or if, in the first instance, the master had used 
the stronger cables, there would be no liability.82 
The dissent seems to make sense.  The majority noted that, often 
enough, if property is damaged in consequence of an act of God, one who 
benefits from that damage or destruction is not legally obligated to pay 
compensation.83  It seems to be a superficial distinction to say that had the 
captain’s cables held fast, the consequential damage would have been an 
unavoidable accident due to an act of God, whereas by retying the vessel 
with stronger cables, the ensuing damage was not an act of God and 
therefore liability attaches. 
The dissent also analyzed the case in terms of contract law.  He 
emphasized that the defendant was “lawfully in position” at the dock, and 
that “one who constructs a dock to the navigable line of waters and enters 
into contractual relations with the owner of a vessel to moor at the same, 
takes the risk of damage to his dock by a boat caught there by a storm” if 
the damage “could not have been avoided in the exercise of due care.”84 
One commentator of the Vincent case, Robert Keeton, suggests that a 
basis for liability in the case hinges on the moral sense of the community.85  
According to Keeton, the case was one of “conditional privilege,” under 
which one could “use the property of another in circumstances of private 
necessity” if one “compensate[d] for any harm done.”86  Another view is 
that Vincent is an example of an appropriate application of “strict liability,” 
one that “reduce[s] the administrative costs of decision” by relieving the 
court of the necessity to use cost-benefit analysis, leaving that analysis “in 
private hands where it belongs.”87 
Yet another commentator opines that the decision creates “a noncate-
gory tort, grounded in social mores, which requires compensation from a 
party that used its temporal power to protect its interests, with substantial 
certainty of injury to another, in a situation about which the parties had not 
engaged in prior bargaining.”88  One final view is that Vincent “is not an 
 
82. Id. (Lewis, J.,  dissenting). 
83. Id. 
84. Id. (Lewis, J., dissenting). 
85. Robert Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REV. 401, 428 
(1959). 
86. Id. 
87. Epstein, supra note 56, at 188. 
88. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRINCIPLES OF TORT LAW 235 (Thomson West 2003). 
      
2007] VIOLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 665 
instance of the exercise of a privilege at all.”89  Rather, “[i]t is simply a case 
of intentionally damaging the property of another in the civil sense of 
‘intention,’ that is, of engaging in conduct that one knows, with substantial 
certainty, will lead to that result.”90  This would be “[a]t the very least, . . . 
negligent or reckless behavior” and the commentator concludes that it is not 
at all surprising that the defendant must pay compensation.91 
The principle of the Vincent case is embodied in section 197 of the 
Restatement Second of Torts, illustration 2: 
A moors his boat to B’s wharf and there discharges its cargo, 
whereupon it is his duty to vacate the wharf.  A violent storm then 
arises, and A, to prevent his boat from being washed ashore and 
wrecked, strengthens and renews the cables by which his boat is 
lashed to B’s wharf.  The force of the storm causes the boat to 
damage the wharf.  A is privileged to keep his boat at B’s wharf, 
but . . . he is subject to liability for the harm thereby caused to the 
wharf.92 
A modern case from England involved trespass with respect to jettison 
of oil during a storm at sea, justified by the necessity doctrine.  The case, 
Esso Petroleum Co. v. Southport Corp.,93 involved a claim in trespass, nui-
sance and negligence, for damages incurred to clean up plaintiff’s property 
after a tanker in difficulty discharged oil to prevent “breaking her back,”94 
which would have endangered the ship, her cargo, and the lives of the 
crew.95 
While at sea, a problem suddenly developed in the operations of the 
vessel’s steering mechanism.96  The weather at the time made it impossible 
to drop anchor, and it appeared reasonably clear that any effort to turn the 
ship around was more dangerous than to continue on course towards the 
coast.97  The master recognized there was danger in proceeding into what 
was a narrow channel with defective steering gear, but he considered that 
the lesser of the two evils was to attempt to get away from the storm and 
into sheltered water, rather than put back to sea.98  He was concerned that 
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the lives of people on board could be jeopardized if he turned the ship 
around and proceeded back out to sea.  The master began to discharge the 
oil tanks in order to lighten the ship, and over four hundred tons of oil were 
released.99  The ship became stranded.100  The oil deposited on the plain-
tiff’s foreshore, and extended for about seven and one-half miles.101  The 
people on board, however, were safe and the ship eventually was towed. 
The plaintiff argued that there was trespass from the bare fact that oil 
was discharged onto the plaintiff’s property.  In addition, the plaintiff al-
leged negligent navigation resulting in the jettison of oil and stranding of 
the ship.  The master explained that the stranding was due to a defect in the 
steering, and was not due to negligence.  Principally, the defendant argued 
on the defense of necessity—that in discharging the oil, the master “was 
doing no more than was reasonably necessary for the safety of the crew and 
of the ship and cargo.”102 
The trial judge stated that “[t]he safety of human lives belongs to a dif-
ferent scale of values from the safety of property.  The two are beyond com-
parison and the necessity for saving life has at all times been considered a 
proper ground for inflicting such damage as may be necessary on another’s 
property.”103  The judge found that there was no negligence in the action 
taken in response to the sudden defect in the steering mechanism.104  
Accepting the trial judge’s finding that there was no negligence, the House 
of Lords affirmed the lower court’s conclusion that there was no liability on 
the part of the tanker’s owners.105 
With respect to the defense of necessity, the court stated: 
I am not prepared to hold without further consideration that a man 
is entitled to damage the property of another without compensating 
him merely because the infliction of such damage is necessary in 
order to save his own property.  I doubt whether the court in such 
circumstances can be asked to evaluate the relation of the damage 
done to the property saved, by inquiring, for example, whether it is 
permissible to do £5,000 worth of damage to a third party in order 
to save property worth £10,000.  In the ordinary case of jettison 
the property which is sacrificed is the property of a person who is 
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interested in the venture, and an equitable adjustment is made by 
the application of general average.  The same considerations may 
not apply to the property of a third party who has no stake in the 
venture which is being saved.106 
The court noted, however, that the imminent danger was not only to the 
ship, but that the lives of the crew were endangered as well.107 
The House of Lords noted that in the necessity doctrine, if the exigent 
circumstances are occasioned by the actor’s negligence, the defense would 
not be available.108  However, the evidence was inconclusive as to what 
caused the defect in the steering gear.109  The court held that there was no 
negligence proven on the part of the master with respect to any defect in his 
ship, and that based on the necessity doctrine in the context of saving lives 
there would be no liability for the damages to plaintiff’s property caused by 
the jettison of oil from the tanker.110  The case stands thus for the propo-
sition that property may be destroyed when necessary to save human life, 
and that no compensation is payable if the person who destroys the property 
has not been at fault in creating the life-threatening danger. 
B. TRESPASS TO RECOVER LIVESTOCK 
As noted in Section 197 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the 
necessity doctrine may justify trespass onto another’s property in order to 
prevent serious harm to livestock (i.e., chattel) that have wandered there.111  
In addition, sections 100-106 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, set forth 
principles by which one is entitled to use force against another for the sole 
purpose of recovering chattel.112 
Arlowski v. Foglio113 dealt with this issue.  The plaintiffs and defendant 
owned farms that were contiguous to each other.114  Some of the fencing for 
which plaintiffs were responsible was inadequate.115  Several of defendant’s 
cattle roamed onto plaintiffs’ land.116  The plaintiffs, husband and wife, 
took possession of the cattle and locked them in their barn.117  The 
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defendant came over and demanded the return of his cattle.118  This request 
was refused, and the husband threatened to kill him unless he departed.119  
Later, the defendant returned to again try and retrieve his cattle because he 
feared the cattle would be hungry and thirsty.120  He had tried to get the 
help of local selectmen, but no one was available to come to his aid.121  He 
carried a pistol because he wanted to defend himself, if necessary, against a 
vicious dog kept by the plaintiffs.122  Indeed, he was attacked by the dog 
and shot the dog, wounding but not killing it.123  Then, the plaintiffs set 
upon to severely beat the defendant; the defendant in turn fought back and 
ended up injuring the wife.124  Later, selectmen retrieved the cows and re-
turned them to the defendant.125  Both parties ended up suing each other for 
assault and battery.126 
According to Section 197 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the 
defendant would not be liable for any harm done in the exercise of the priv-
ilege to enter given the plaintiff’s negligence in bringing about the situation 
that necessitated the entry.  The court held that the plaintiffs were not in 
lawful possession of the livestock since the livestock’s incursion onto the 
land, was caused by their defective division fence.127  Also, the court found 
that the defendant’s entry to retrieve his livestock, which the plaintiffs had 
wrongfully retained, was lawful.128  It was proper for the defendant to take 
such precautions to known dangers involved in such entry as a reasonable 
person would deem proper, including a gun to protect himself against the 
vicious dog.129  The defendant was awarded damages on his cross-
complaint.130 
C. TRESPASS TO AVOID AN OBSTRUCTION ON PUBLIC HIGHWAYS 
There are numerous instances of trivial entry on another’s property due 
to obstructions on public roads.  For example, on many country roads where 
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someone’s lawn to avoid oncoming traffic or to avoid a puddle, and such 
intrusions are considered justifiable trespass.131  Or, if a public highway is 
obstructed, one may go around the obstruction, trespassing on private land 
for that purpose.  According to Section 195 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, if a flood or fallen tree renders a road impassable, one is “privi-
leged . . . to enter . . . upon neighboring land in possession of another.”132  
In such cases the actor is liable to pay for any harm his entry might cause. 
The Restatement view appears to have had its progeny in the 1851 
case, Campbell v. Race,133 in which the defendant was sued for trespass to 
plaintiff’s property.  The defendant argued that he had a right of way based 
in necessity, because the public highway adjacent to plaintiff’s property was 
impassable due to snowdrifts.134  The defendant went over the adjoining 
fields of the plaintiff, doing no unnecessary damage, and then returned to 
the highway at the point where it was passable.135 
The plaintiff argued that the necessity doctrine is limited, in cases of 
trespass, to situations of “inevitable necessity or accident,” neither of which 
existed in this case.136  The judge disagreed, and stated what he considered 
was a well-settled rule: 
If a traveller in a highway, by unexpected and unforeseen occur-
rences, such as a sudden flood, heavy drifts of snow, or the falling 
of a tree, is shut out from the travelled paths, so that he cannot 
reach his destination, without passing upon adjacent lands, he is 
certainly under a necessity so to do. . . .  Serious inconveniences, 
to say the least, would follow, especially in a climate like our own, 
if this right were denied to those who have occasion to pass over 
the public way.  Not only would intercourse and business be some-
times suspended, but life itself would be endangered. . . .  Such a 
temporary and unavoidable use of private property, must be 
regarded as one of those incidental burdens to which all property 
in a civilized community is subject. . . .  It is a maxim of the 
common law, that where public convenience and necessity come 
in conflict with private right, the latter must yield to the former.137 
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The court also noted that, had another way been available to proceed 
beyond the obstruction without trespassing on plaintiff’s land, the defendant 
should have selected that alternative.138 
D. REMOVING, DISMANTLING OR DESTROYING OBSTRUCTIONS TO 
NAVIGATION 
In some instances, property owners engage in the destruction of prop-
erty in order to preserve their right of passage through navigable waters.  
For example, McKeesport Sawmill Co. v. Pennsylvania Co.139 was an action 
for damages for the destruction of a coal barge.140  The barge had slipped its 
moorings and was carried downstream where it got stuck in a great chunk 
of slush ice and obstructed a bridge owned by the defendant railroad.141  
The barge remained stuck there for several days, and the owner did nothing 
to rescue it or get it out of the way.142  The defendants dislodged the barge, 
finding it necessary as a last resort to break up the barge in order to effect 
its removal.143  The defendants’ workers cut the barge to pieces only after 
other means had been tried and failed in efforts to remove it.144 
The plaintiff introduced evidence that impressed the jury with the idea 
that the barge could have been saved by first breaking up the ice with a 
steamboat, and then attaching a line to pull the barge away.145  The judge 
instructed the jury that the defendants should be held to a standard in which 
they did as little injury as possible to the barge, and that, if they did not, the 
defendants would be liable.146  The jury found for the plaintiff.147 
In reversing and ordering a new trial, the court of appeals noted that in 
exercising the right to remove an obstruction in navigable waters, the exi-
gencies are such that one need not be held to the standard of ordinary care; 
one needs to simply avoid gross negligence or recklessness.148  The action 
in removing the obstruction must be assessed in light of the exigencies of 
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the situation.149  One does not have to try and save the obstructing property, 
“but simply not to recklessly or unnecessarily injure or destroy it.”150 
The court noted that the barge 
was a derelect, brought down upon them by the high water, and 
whether it got loose through the neglect of the owner to properly 
moor it or not is not material.  It was astray, without a master, and 
thereby became a floating nuisance, which they were entitled to 
ward off or get out of the way as best they could.151 
The court added: 
[W]hile they could not wantonly or unnecessarily destroy it, they 
were not required to save it for an unknown owner, or have par-
ticular regard to interests, which he himself took no pains to assert.  
To hold, therefore, that care should have been taken to do the least 
possible injury in the removal of the barge, was going farther than 
was warranted.  The defendants were authorized to take such steps 
as were reasonably necessary to free themselves from the danger, 
which is quite different.152 
In addition, the court noted that the defendants had urged the plaintiff to 
remove the obstruction, but nothing happened, so that the defendants had no 
reasonable legal alternative but to take action on their own.153 
Thus, the general rule is that if one’s approach in navigable waters is 
obstructed, by accident or otherwise, one has the right to remove the ob-
struction in a manner that is consistent with the exigencies of the case, 
taking care not to act in a grossly negligent or wanton manner in removing 
it.154  Of course, one must first pursue a reasonable legal alternative, such as 
getting the owner of the obstruction to take appropriate action, assuming 
that the danger posed by the obstruction is not imminent.155 
In Philiber v. Matson, 156 the same standard of conduct in extricating an 
obstruction was discussed.  The plaintiff’s raft, while floating down a navi-
gable highway, got stuck.157  The defendant, coming upon the scene in 
another raft, tried to avoid colliding with plaintiffs’ raft and got thrown to 
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one side and stuck on the shore.158  Then a third raft came down and 
jammed between the two.159  At that point, there was danger that other rafts 
would become entangled because the stream was crowded with rafts.160  
The defendant thereupon cut away so much of the plaintiffs’ raft as would 
enable him to get his own raft loose.161  The court held that this was an 
emergency situation and that the defendant had a right to extricate his raft in 
the only way he could—to cut it loose—provided he did no more than was 
necessary to free his raft.162  “If, on the other hand, it was not necessary to 
cut plaintiffs’ raft for that purpose, but the act was wanton and uncalled for, 
or more injury was done than the circumstances required,” the defendant 
would be liable for damages.163 
In Forster v. Juniata Bridge Co.,164 the court considered a situation 
involving a span of bridge that had become dislodged in a storm and 
obstructed property of the defendant.165  In March 1846, a span of a bridge 
was swept away by a flood in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and lodged on the 
end of an island owned by the defendant.166  The portion of the bridge 
caused damage to the defendant’s property.167  It diverted a stream, caused 
soil to be washed away, destroyed crops, and interfered with livestock 
pastures.168  The defendant asked the president of the bridge company to 
remove the span of bridge that had lodged on his property, but the company 
failed to take action.169  After several months, the defendant hired help to 
dismantle and remove the obstruction and piled it up near his barn.170  He 
used some of the timber dismantled from the bridge to erect other 
buildings.171 
The court concluded that no one was at fault for the initial obstruction 
of the span of bridge because it was an unavoidable accident.172  Thus, the 
bridge company would not be liable for damages to the owner of the land 
where the span of bridge came to rest.  The court found that the plaintiff 
 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at *2. 
160. Id. at *1. 
161. Id. at *2. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at *1. 
164. 16 Pa. 393, 1851 WL 5794 (1851). 





170. Id. at *2. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at *6. 
      
2007] VIOLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 673 
would have been justified in entering the land of the defendant without 
asking permission, in order to remove the span of bridge.173  The refusal of 
the company to remove it did not divest them of the property or bar them 
from reclaiming it; that is, the span of bridge remained the property of the 
plaintiff while lodged on defendant’s property.174 
The court found that the defendant was justified in dismantling and 
removing the obstruction, but that he was liable for damages to the extent 
that he appropriated the wooden assemblage for his own use.175  The court 
also concluded that the defendant was not entitled to compensation for costs 
incurred in dismantling the bridge and removing it.176 
E. TRESPASS—UNINTENTIONAL AND NON-NEGLIGENT ENTRY ONTO 
ANOTHER’S LAND 
There are numerous situations that can arise, predicated on a kind of 
necessity, where through circumstances beyond one’s control, one ends up 
on another’s property and causes damage.  Section 166 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, is entitled: Non-liability for Accidental Intrusion.  This 
section provides that an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land of 
another by one not engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity does not 
subject the actor to liability to the possessor even though the entry causes 
harm to the possessor.177  However, there is a fine line between action 
deemed intentional, and that deemed unintentional. 
For instance, suppose a motorist suffers a heart attack, immediately 
loses consciousness, and his car runs onto plaintiff’s land, causing damages. 
First City National Bank of Houston v. Japhet178 dealt with just such a 
situation.  The driver suffered a heart attack, lost consciousness, and died; 
his car in turn ran into plaintiff’s land and caused damage to a tree and a 
wall.179  The driver’s estate argued that “the occurrence was the result of an 
act of God or an unavoidable accident.”180 
The court referred to illustration 2 under Section 166 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
A, while driving his automobile along the street in the exercise of 
due care, is suddenly overcome by a paralytic stroke, which he had 
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no reason to anticipate.  He loses control of the automobile and 
falls across the steering wheel thereby turning the car so that it 
runs upon and damages B’s lawn.  A is not liable to B.181 
There was no liability because the intrusion was unintentional and non-
negligent.182  The actor was not legally at fault for losing control of the 
automobile and destroying the property of another.183 
Ruiz v. Forman,184 a 1974 Texas case, involved the intentional rather 
than unintentional action of a driver.  A driver swerved to avoid an oncom-
ing vehicle and ended causing property damage to plaintiff’s land.185  In an 
action for damages to the plaintiff’s property, the defendant testified that he 
“consciously and intentionally turned his wheels to the right to avoid hitting 
the truck,” and thereby his car entered upon the plaintiff’s land and caused 
damages.186  The court commented that, given the parties’ stipulation to the 
facts, this case would come within the ambit of Section 197 of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, as a privileged entry onto the property of another.187  
However, the defendant would be liable for damages because it was an 
intentional invasion.188  The entry was intentional in the sense that the 
defendant intended the act which resulted in the trespass, and that in turn 
caused the trespass.189 
Most states would not impose liability in situations of accidental loss of 
control of a vehicle in the absence of a showing of negligence.190  For ex-
ample, in Phillips v. Pickwick Stages,191 a driver was proceeding down a 
street when he observed that a parade was in progress and the area, which 
the driver was approaching, was closed to traffic.192  A number of people 
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were gathered in the street ahead.193  The driver was traveling at about ten 
miles per hour.194  He tried to stop, but the foot pedal, which operated the 
brakes, suddenly broke.195  The driver then started to turn into a lamppost in 
an effort to crash and halt the vehicle, but before reaching it a child stepped 
out into the street in front his vehicle.196  At that point the driver had the 
choice of either hitting the child or turning his vehicle away from the child, 
in which case he would be headed toward the crowd.197  He tried to stop the 
car by use of the emergency brake, but it was inadequate to bring the car to 
a stop.198  He veered away from the child and into the crowd.199  Fortu-
nately, no one was killed, but three people sustained injuries and sued for 
damages.200 
This case recognizes the general principle that that if a driver, in the 
course of an emergency, acts as a reasonable person would in choosing to 
injure the plaintiff in order to avoid a child, there is no liability for plain-
tiff’s injuries.201 However, the jury found that the defendant negligently 
failed to sound his horn as he approached the crowd of people who had 
their backs facing the defendant’s approach, and that he was further 
negligent in that he should have known or discovered the defect in the foot 
pedal.202 
F. AVIATION EMERGENCY LANDING CASES 
Some cases involve emergency landings of airplanes in order to save 
the lives of passengers and crews, which in turn destroy private property.203  
In such instances it appears that the issue of damages depends strictly on 
whether negligence can be shown.204 
In the early years of aviation, and well into the 1950s, aviation was 
regarded as an ultra-hazardous activity, requiring the imposition of strict 
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rationale was that even the best constructed and maintained aircraft was 
incapable of complete control so that flying created a risk that the plane, 
even though carefully constructed, maintained and operated, may crash and 
injure people and structures on the ground. 
As aviation became a common mode of transportation, and as technical 
strides in the navigation of aircraft developed, the courts stopped looking 
upon aviation as an ultra-hazardous activity.  Cases in several states, for 
example, California,206 New York207 and Washington,208 have indicated that 
aviation is no longer considered an ultra-hazardous activity, so that owners 
and operators of aircraft are not strictly liable for ground damage that is not 
occasioned by their fault.  Today, airplanes will occasionally crash mysteri-
ously, but these often are experimental aircraft built and handled by the 
owners.209  The operation of experimental aircraft continues to be regarded 
as an ultra-hazardous activity and, therefore, can result in strict liability for 
damages.210 
Section 197 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that an inten-
tional entry into the land of another is privileged if it reasonably appears 
necessary to prevent serious harm to the actor or a third person, and that 
“[w]here the entry is for the benefit of the actor or a third person, he is 
subject to liability for any harm done in the exercise of the privilege. . . to 
any legally protected interest of the possessor in the land or connected with 
it.”211  On this view, if the pilot’s landing of the aircraft is “intentional,” 
albeit in an emergency situation, there should be liability for damages irre-
spective of negligence.  Illustration 3 of that section provides an example of 
a forced landing in which it is stipulated that the pilot was not negligent: 
 
206. See S. California Edison Co. v. Coleman, 310 P.2d 504, 505 (Cal. App. 1957) (“There is 
no California case which holds that a pilot is liable for collision damage independent of negli-
gence”); Boyd v. White, 276 P.2d 92, 98 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954) (identifying as the general rule 
in California that “the owner (or operator) of an airship is only liable for injury inflicted upon 
another when such damage is caused by a defect in the plane or its negligent operation”). 
207. See Wood v. United Airlines, Inc., 32 Misc. 2d 955, 958 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1961) (rejecting 
strict liability in the context of operating an airplane, and applying the rule that “to constitute an 
actionable trespass there must be an intent to do the very act which results in the immediate 
damage”).   
208. See Crosby v. Cox Aircraft Co. of Washington, 746 P.2d 1198, 1202 (Wash. 1987) 
(“[O]wners and operators of flying aircraft are liable for ground damage caused by such aircraft 
only upon a showing of negligence.”).   
209. See, e.g., Mary Bender, Pilot Hurt When Experimental Aircraft Crashes in High Desert, 
THE PRESS ENTERPRISE (Riverside, California), Mar. 18, 2007, at B6; David R. Anderson, Pilot’s 
Son Suspects Engine Failure, THE OREGONIAN, July 18, 2006, at A6; J.C. Lexon & Amy Allyn 
Swann, Trenton Plane Crash Kills Pilot, Injures Student, THE AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Feb. 17, 
2006 at B7; Architect Killed in Crash of Experimental Aircraft He Designed, ASSOCIATED PRESS, 
Nov. 12, 2005; Pine Island Plane Crash Kills Two, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 29, 2005. 
210. See Jakubiiak, supra note 205, at 428. 
211. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 197(2) (1965). 
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A, an aviator, while carefully and skillfully operating his airplane 
makes a forced landing on B’s field in the reasonable belief that it 
is necessary to do so for the protection of himself and his plane.  A 
is not liable for his mere entry, but. . . is subject to liability for any 
harm thereby caused to B or to B’s buildings, crops or other 
belongings.212 
Thus, under the Restatement view, while there is a privilege to make a 
forced landing, liability for damages is imposed irrespective of negligence, 
where the entry is intentional.213 
Boyd v. White,214 a California case, seems to depart from the 
Restatement view because, under the Restatement illustration, the aviator is 
required to pay compensation for damages, irrespective of negligence.  In 
Boyd, shortly after takeoff, the motor of an aircraft started to sputter, and 
the pilot began to lose altitude.215  The pilot attempted to turn back to the 
airport but realized he could not make it.216  He then observed a schoolyard 
and a baseball field and decided to make a forced landing there.217  He 
circled the field, losing altitude all the while, and did not reach the field.218  
Instead, he crashed into plaintiff’s house, causing damages, but no loss of 
life.219  The pilot had leased the plane, and the plaintiff sued both the pilot 
and the plane’s owner.220 
The court expressed the general rule that, properly handled by a 
competent pilot exercising reasonable care, an airplane is not an inherently 
dangerous instrument, so that the owner or the operator of an airplane is 
only liable for injury inflicted upon another when such damage is caused by 
a defect in the plane or its negligent operation.221  Thus, the court held that 
the defendant would be liable by ordinary negligence principles, so that the 
landowner would need to prove negligence in the operation or maintenance 
of the aircraft in order to win damages. 
Other cases concerning ground damage have focused on whether the 
conduct of the pilot was volitional or involuntary in landing the aircraft.  
For example, in a New York case, Wood v. United Air Lines Inc.,222 two 
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213. Id. 
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airplanes collided in midair and one of them fell onto an apartment building 
and exploded, causing personal injuries and property damages.  Various 
plaintiffs sued for damages under the theory of trespass.223  The plaintiffs 
argued strict liability for trespass and for consequent damages, “irrespective 
of the absence of any negligence or of any intent to invade the rights of 
those on the ground.”224  The court held that aviation is no longer con-
sidered an ultra-hazardous activity.225  Further, the court rejected the theory 
of trespass, emphasizing that an essential element of a trespass is the 
intention to do the very act that amounts to or produces the unlawful 
invasion.226  There was no evidence that the airplane was in any way under 
the pilot’s control when it plunged into the ground.227  The collision which 
led to the crash did not even occur during the course of an attempt to 
land.228  The court held there was no liability because the intrusion was 
unintentional in that the pilots no longer were in control of the aircraft, and 
non-negligent.229  The court apparently did not consider, for purposes of its 
ruling, the question of whether the midair collision was a product of 
negligence. 
In a similar, earlier case, Southern California Edison Co. v. 
Coleman,230 a California court held there was no basis for holding an 
aircraft owner strictly liable for damage occurring to a utility company’s 
lines when the plane struck its electric line.231  The aircraft owners claimed 
that there was no trespass because an unavoidable downdraft caused the 
airplane to drop to the level of the wires.232  The contact with the wires was 
unintentional and not the result of negligence.233 
The approach taken by the courts in the abovementioned cases is tied to 
the principle, stated in Section 166 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
that an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land of another by one not 
engaged in an abnormally dangerous activity does not subject the actor to 
liability to the possessor even though the entry causes harm to the 
 
223. Wood, 32 Misc. 2d at 956. 
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possessor.234  In sum, these rulings are in opposition to rulings from an 
earlier period when aviation was considered an ultra-hazardous activity.235 
Following the Wood decision, the American Law Institute adopted 
section 520A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Ground Damage From 
Aircraft), which imposes strict liability in such cases: 
If physical harm to land or to persons or chattels on the ground is 
caused by the ascent, descent or flight of aircraft, or by the 
dropping or falling of an object from the aircraft, 
(a) the operator of the aircraft is subject to liability for the 
harm, even though he has exercised the utmost care to prevent 
it, and 
(b) the owner of the aircraft is subject to similar liability if he 
has authorized or permitted the operation.236 
Comment b of that section states: 
Under the rule set forth in this Section, any flight by aircraft, 
together with ascent to or descent from the flight, is an activity of 
such a character that both the operator of the aircraft and its owner 
if he has consented to or permitted the operation are subject to 
strict liability for physical harm to land, or to persons or chattels 
on the ground.237 
Comment c of that section takes the view that 
while the safety record [of aviation] is greatly improved it still 
cannot be said that the danger of ground damage has been so 
eliminated or reduced that the ordinary rules of negligence law 
should be applied.  Although there will be relatively few cases in 
which an airplane falls upon a house, for example, the gravity of 
the harm resulting when a few tons of flaming gasoline descend 
upon a dwelling is still a factor to be taken into account.  Together 
with this is the obvious fact that those on the ground have no place 
to hide from falling aircraft and are helpless to select any locality 
for their residence or business in which they will not be exposed to 
 
234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 166 (1965). 
235. See, e.g., Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Dunlop, 266 N.Y.S. 469 (N.Y. 1933) (finding 
a pilot strictly liable for damage caused when the airplane he was piloting crashed into a utility 
tower); Hahn v. United States Airlines, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. N.Y. 1954) (holding an air-
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236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520A (1965). 
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the risk, however minimized it may be.  Aviation flights differ in 
this respect from other kinds of traffic and transportation.238 
It should be noted that Section 520A pertains solely to ground damage, 
and leaves the ordinary rules of negligence to determine liability for harm 
to passengers or others participating in aviation.239  Several states have 
statutes that impose strict liability for ground damage.240 
The principle set forth in Section 520A has apparently not prevailed in 
more recent cases, and to an extent it has been discredited.  Some think it 
was a “historical mistake.”241  Since 1976, when Section 520A was 
promulgated, the American Law Institute has in some measure retreated 
from the idea of strict liability for ground damage by aircraft.  In the 
Tentative Draft of Restatement (Third) of Torts, in a section called “A 
special note on aviation ground damage,” the committee states that in light 
of the dramatic decline in the airplane crash rate since Section 520A was 
adopted, and given that airplane crashes are generally a result of negligence, 
“the strict-liability issue is no longer one that has major practical 
significance (and similarly explains why there are so few modern cases 
considering the issue).  In these circumstances, the issue is left open in this 
Restatement.”242 
A 1995 case apparently ignored the principle set forth in Section 520A, 
and ruled along the same lines as in the Wood and Coleman cases 
mentioned above.  In re Air Crash Disaster at Cove Neck,243 involved a 
Columbian passenger airplane that had exhausted its fuel supply while 
circling La Guardia Airport waiting for clearance to land.  The plane 
crashed into a residential backyard in Long Island’s populated North Shore, 
causing damages to non-passengers on the ground.244  The plaintiffs in this 
case did not sustain physical injuries.245 The residents sued for property 
damages and emotional distress as a result of witnessing the aftermath of 
the crash in their yard, on the theory that the defendant committed 
intentional trespass.246 
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The court held that the facts do not support intentional trespass because 
when the plane ran out of fuel, it became impossible for the pilots to control 
the aircraft and it unfortunately and accidentally crashed into the plaintiffs’ 
yard.247  The court noted that intentional trespass is the “intentional and 
unlawful invasion of another’s land,” and that the intent requirement means 
that the tortfeasor “need only intend the act which amounts to or produces 
the unlawful invasion, and the intrusion must be . . . the immediate or 
inevitable consequence of what . . . he does so negligently as to amount to 
willfulness.”248 
In similar vein, in a case from Washington State, Crosby v. Cox 
Aircraft Company,249 a property owner brought action against the owner 
and operator of an aircraft, seeking to recover for ground damage inflicted 
by the crash landing of the aircraft.250  The highest court of that state held 
that the owner and operator would be liable for ground damage only upon a 
showing of negligence, and that strict liability did not apply.251  In this case, 
the pilot was flying near Seattle and the engine ran out of fuel in mid-
flight.252  There may have been something wrong with the fuel system.253  
The pilot was forced to crash-land the plane, and damaged the plaintiff’s 
garage.254  Of course, running out of fuel likely is negligence, but the plain-
tiff sought to impose strict liability.  A new trial was ordered in which the 
plaintiff attempted to prove negligence.255  It is not clear from this case 
whether the landing was considered intentional or unintentional.  It would 
seem that there was an element of intentionality in that the pilot was able to 
steer the plane even though the engine was not operating since there was no 
more fuel. 
The Crosby case had a vigorous dissent that argued Section 520A of 
the Restatement ought to be applicable, and that the majority had 
misinterpreted the provision.256  The dissent argued that the burden of loss 
should be placed on the “person who voluntarily chose to fly that airplane, 
for his own purpose and benefit” and not on the “wholly innocent, non-
active, non-benefited, but damaged person.”257  The dissent suggested that 
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strong public policy seems to favor strict liability for damage occurring on 
the ground.258  For example, there is an unequal distribution of the benefits 
and risks of aviation between those in the air and those on the ground.  
Without strict liability, there is an onerous and expensive burden of proof 
required by the plaintiff in an aviation accident case (although to some 
extent the National Transportation Safety Board,259 which investigates 
every civil aviation accident in the United States, and provides information 
that significantly eases the plaintiff’s burden in case preparation).  
Moreover, the owners of aircraft have the ability to spread the financial 
risks with insurance.260  Finally, a high degree of harm usually results, 
despite the exercise of due care, when an airplane crashes. 
G. ACTS DIVERTING A DANGER FROM THE ACTOR TO A THIRD 
PARTY 
Some private necessity cases involve emergencies in which one party 
diverts a threat, such as flood waters, to save his own property, and in doing 
so causes damage or destruction to the property of others.  For example, in 
Whalley v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., Co.,261 the defendant railroad cut 
gaps in an embankment to protect its railroad tracks from the accumulation 
of water after an unprecedented rainfall.262  The action taken by the railroad 
company diverted the position at which the water would accumulate.263  As 
a result of this action, the water was diverted, causing flooding of plaintiff’s 
land and destruction of crops.264 
The plaintiff sued for damages.265  The court concluded that “in order 
to get rid of the misfortune which had happened to [the defendants] . . . 
which . . . would not have injured the plaintiff, they did something which 
brought an injury upon the plaintiff [and] [u]nder [these] circumstances . . . 
the defendants are liable.”266  The court found that, under the necessity 
doctrine, the evil to be averted (damage to the defendant’s railroad tracks) 
did not outweigh the evil that resulted (damage to the plaintiff’s land).  That 
is, a greater good did not result.267  According to the court, the harm to the 
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plaintiff, as it turned out, was greater than the harm averted by the 
defendant’s action, in terms of the amount of damages.268 
The result was better for the defendant, but resulted in damages to the 
plaintiff that would not otherwise have occurred.269  According to the court, 
even if the damage to the railroad tracks had been much more extensive 
than that which resulted to plaintiff’s land by diverting the waters—the 
necessity doctrine does not justify harming another’s property in order to 
protect one’s own under the facts of this case.270 
The court alluded to an exception in situations that involve an immi-
nent “common enemy” such as a fire that is approaching and presents a 
common threat to the community.271  In a “common enemy” situation, the 
actor seeks to avert an imminent harm which poses a threat to a number of 
individuals in common.  The following is an example of a common enemy 
situation: If an extraordinary flood is seen to be coming upon a community, 
and someone builds barriers to prevent the flood from encroaching upon his 
land, the danger might thereby affect neighboring lands instead.  The 
danger in this example is a “common enemy” that equally threatens inno-
cent parties, and in seeking a means to avert the harm to oneself, the danger 
will devolve on someone else.272  Each party has an equal opportunity of 
taking such measures are necessary to protect oneself, even though that may 
result in injuring one’s neighbor.273 
In Whalley, the danger had already “hit” the defendant’s embankment; 
it was not a threat to the plaintiff’s property.  There was no “common ene-
my” which the defendant sought to protect against.  Rather, the defendants 
diverted the accumulation of water that had already begun to affect the 
railroad tracks, to the plaintiff.274 
The Whalley case is embodied in illustration 5 of Section 197 of the 
Restatement: 
An unprecedented rainfall causes such a quantity of water to 
accumulate against one of the sides of the A Railroad Company’s 
embankment as to endanger the embankment.  A is not privileged 
to cut trenches and to cause the water to flow onto B’s land if the 
probable harm to B’s land is in excess of or even equal to the 
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is privileged to flood B’s land if the probable harm to B’s land is 
less than the probable harm to A from the loss of its embankment, 
but . . . A is subject to liability to B for any harm thereby caused to 
his land.275 
According to Comment c of Section 197, in determining reasonable-
ness of the actor’s conduct 
the probable advantage to the actor to be expected from the entry 
must be weighed against the probable detriment to the possessor of 
the land or other persons properly upon it.  Thus, the actor’s entry 
to avoid death or serious bodily harm would be unreasonable if it 
would involve a more serious or even an equal risk of harm to the 
possessor of the land or other lawful occupants.  Likewise, where 
the entry is for the purpose of protecting the actor’s land or chat-
tels, not only would any serious risk of harm to the person of the 
possessor or other lawful occupants make the entry unreasonable, 
but so would a disproportionate, or even an equal, risk of harm to 
the land or chattels of the possessor or chattel of third persons 
lawfully on the land.276 
As mentioned, in Whalley the court found that the harm to the plaintiff’s 
land was in excess of the harm that would have accrued to the defendant’s 
railroad tracks.277 
Another situation involves deflecting a danger from one party to 
another with respect to personal property rather than real property.  Section 
263 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Privilege Created by Private 
Necessity), is based on Section 197.278  Section 263 provides a privilege to 
destroy the personal property of others in necessitous circumstances: 
One is privileged to commit an act which would otherwise be a 
trespass to the chattel of another or a conversion of it, if it or is 
reasonably believed to be reasonable and necessary to protect the 
person or property of the actor, the other or a third person from 
serious harm . . .279 
The Comment to this section indicates that the act of destroying 
another’s personal property to save one’s own property must not only be 
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necessary but also reasonable.  This is required so that “one whose chattel 
of small value is threatened with serious harm or even with complete 
destruction may not be privileged to destroy a far more valuable chattel of 
another in order to protect it.”280 
In Latta v. New Orleans & N.W. Ry.,281 two boxcars loaded with cotton 
caught fire, possibly from a spark from a passing locomotive engine, or 
possibly from a worker’s pipe or cigarette that may have caused smoldering 
and then the fire.282  At any rate, the defendant was not at fault for causing 
the boxcars to catch fire.  Because the boxcars were adjacent to the depot, 
and the depot was in peril of catching fire, about seven or eight people, 
including employees of the defendant, pushed the burning boxcars about 
twenty-five feet down the track and let one of the cars come to rest near a 
storage bin which held wooden staves owned by the plaintiff.  The burning 
car in turn set fire to the wooden staves.283 
The plaintiff sued for damages.  The defendant invoked the necessity 
doctrine.  He argued that the burning cars imminently threatened the de-
struction of the defendant’s depot, that there was an impulse which led to 
the removal of the burning cars to the place where they destroyed the 
property of plaintiff, and that this effort to push the burning cars away from 
the depot “may be regarded as natural in some sense.”284 
The Supreme Court of Louisiana held that the defendant had no right to 
sacrifice plaintiff’s property in order to save its own, and was liable for 
damages.285  It stated that the removal of the burning cars to save defen-
dant’s property from catching fire was “hardly that kind of a natural im-
pulse which impels one to brush a wasp from one’s face or to get rid of a 
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dangerous squib;286 it belongs rather to that class of sordid impulses which 
may and should be restrained.”287 
The defendant further argued that the law of necessity recognizes a 
right of an individual to destroy the property of another in order to save his 
own, where it is impracticable to save both parties’ property, and that it 
would be proper to consider whether the actor averted a greater evil by 
sacrificing property of lesser value than his own property, which was 
saved.288  The saving of the depot, being of greater value than the wooden 
staves of the plaintiff, was therefore justified.289  The court dismissed this 
argument as an idea that “would lead to great injustice.”290  Thus, this case 
is much the same in its analysis and result as the Whalley case.  Latta 
apparently is at odds with Section 263 of the Restatement—had the 
Restatement view been followed, the relative values of the property sacri-
ficed and the property saved would have been a consideration. 
Swan-Finch Oil Corp. v. Warner-Quinlin Co291 presented another situ-
ation involving diverting a danger from one party to another.  The defen-
dant owned a wooden barge that contained 6000 barrels of crude fuel oil 
and was moored to a dock, also owned by the defendant, in Staten Island 
Sound.292  Lightning struck the barge and ignited the oil.293  The fire rapidly 
spread through the barge, and the fire department was summoned.294  
Meanwhile, about ten men under the charge of the dock superintendent 
prepared to fight the fire on their own.295  They cast the barge adrift by 
cutting the hawsers which tied it to the dock.296  They pushed the barge, 
which was still on fire, out into the stream, and, as a result, the other boats 
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moored at the dock were saved.297  A passing tug boat immediately pushed 
the blazing barge across the stream to an island some 800 feet distant from 
the dock.298  Later, a New York City fire boat arrived on the scene, and 
made unsuccessful efforts to quench the fire.299  Several hours later, the 
barge, was still burning, was carried away from the island by the tide.300  
The city fireboat pursued it and made every effort to keep the fire from 
spreading to other boats and property.301  The fireboat managed to push the 
barge onto the beach of another island, but after a half an hour it again 
floated away.302  Finally, the barge collided into the docks owned by the 
plaintiffs, and blazing oil escaped from the hull and set fire to the plaintiffs’ 
property, causing extensive damage.303 
The plaintiffs sued for damages caused by the burning barge.304  The 
defendant argued that the necessity of the situation justified the casting 
adrift of the barge.  The court disagreed: 
The defendant’s act in casting adrift this burning cargo of oil, in 
order to save its own property from destruction, was a violation of 
a legal duty owing to the plaintiffs and others whose property was 
thus put in jeopardy.  While it cannot be said that it was intended 
by the casting adrift of this barge to set on fire the property of the 
plaintiffs or any one else, nevertheless it is clear that the intent of 
the defendant was to save its own property, irrespective of any 
danger or consequence to the property of others.  The law cannot 
allow one deliberately to cast upon another any dangerous instru-
mentality, even in self-defense, without being answerable for the 
natural consequences which follow. 
. . . . 
[T]he act complained of cannot be excused because of the emer-
gency or the necessity.  Nor can it be excused on the ground that 
an act of God was the immediate cause of the catastrophe.  It 
makes no difference, it seems to me, what the primary cause of the 






301. Id. at 212-13. 
302. Id. at 212. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
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the act of God.  It was a new and different act, creating a new 
hazard.305 
The court held that there was proximate cause in connection with the 
damage to plaintiffs’ property.306  The damage was foreseeable and not as 
remote in circumstances as to relieve the actor from liability.307 
Perhaps the case hinged principally on the court’s finding that the 
defendant was negligent in using a wooden barge for the transportation of 
inflammable fuel oil in such a large quantity, and in mooring the barge on 
the dock in close proximity to other shipping, without greater fire protec-
tion.  The court’s reasoning was that the defendant created an unreasonable 
risk in the first instance by using a wooden barge to carry inflammable fuel 
oil, and that regardless of how the fire got started, it was reckless to have 
permitted the oil to be transported on that barge.308 
The decision also suggests that the defendant failed to make a 
reasonable choice of evils in casting out the barge in that the action was 
taken “irrespective of any danger or consequence to the property of 
others.”309  The court apparently failed to consider that the action may, in 
fact, have been reasonably calculated to avert a greater danger because a 
number of vessels at the dock would otherwise have caught fire, perhaps 
creating a greater quantum of damage than the plaintiff ended up incurring.  
The record is silent as to the amount of damage sustained by the plaintiff, 
and the value of the boats on the dock that were saved.310  Apparently the 
court deemed irrelevant the question of whether the damages that accrued 
were greater, or less, than the damages averted by the defendant’s action.311 
Thus, the court held that the action in casting adrift the barge was 
wrong because it was foreseeable that such action would cause damage to 
someone else’s property, and that the necessity doctrine simply could be 
used to shield oneself from liability (except in a “common enemy” case) 




306. Id. “[T]here was no intervening, culpable, and efficient agency which broke the chain of 
causation, no negligence by any other actor in the premises, no elements except natural and casual 
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The fire was caused by an act of God—lightning.313  Had the defendant 
kept the barge moored where it was, the resulting, and surely inevitable, 
spread of the fire to the other boats and the dock, would not have imposed 
any liability.  It would probably have been considered an unavoidable acci-
dent caused by an act of God.  In contrast, property owners in such a situa-
tion might well recover based on negligence in that the barge should have 
had a steel hull, and that flammable oil should not be transported in a 
wooden vessel. 
In Protectus Alpha Nav. Co. v. North Pacific Grain Growers,314 a 
vessel owner sued a terminal at which the ship had docked, alleging that 
defendant’s employees had acted negligently in casting the burning ship 
away from the dock while successful firefighting efforts were underway at 
the dock.315  The defendant ordered the ship cast off in defiance of the fire 
chief’s orders.316  The fire was on the verge of being extinguished.317  The 
vessel’s engines were inoperable, and once the vessel was cast adrift, the 
firefighters were delayed by several hours in their plan of shooting high 
expansion foam into the engine room to stop the fire, at which point the en-
gine room exploded and the fire spread rapidly to the ship’s super-
structure.318  One person was killed in the explosion.319 
Defendant argued, among other things, that the danger of explosion 
made it reasonable and prudent for employees to cast off the ship, and that 
the conduct was justified by necessity.320  On the issue of necessity, the 
court held that the danger of explosion was not sufficiently imminent to 
justify defendant’s conduct (in that the fire was small and confined to the 
engine room), and that defendant’s conduct was not reasonable under the 
circumstances.321  The court found the defendant liable for the destruction 
of the ship and awarded compensatory and punitive damages.322 
 
313. Id. at 211. 
314. 585 F.Supp. 1062 (D. Ore. 1984), aff’d, 767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985). 
315. Protectus, 585 F. Supp. at 1064. 





321. Id. at 1066. 
322. Id. at 1068-69. 
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III. VIOLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS BASED ON PUBLIC 
NECESSITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Public necessity contemplates a situation where there is an imminent 
public calamity, and in order to avert this danger it is necessary to destroy 
or damage property.  In the numerous cases that have considered the ques-
tion of public necessity, it appears that “[w]here the danger affects the en-
tire community, or so many people that the public interest is involved, that 
interest serves as a complete justification to the defendant who acts to avert 
the peril to all.”323  This means that “one has a complete privilege to 
destroy, damage, or use real or personal property if the actor reasonably 
believes it to be necessary to avert an imminent public disaster.”324  The 
danger to be averted in cases of public necessity may pertain to property 
only, or it may be a danger to property as well as to life and limb. 
Section 196 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Public Necessity), 
states: “One is privileged to enter land in the possession of another if it is, 
or if the actor reasonably believes it to be, necessary for the purpose of 
averting an imminent public disaster.”325  This privilege is to protect the 
public from “an impending public disaster such as a conflagration, flood, 
earthquake, or pestilence.”326  Section 196 is supplemented by Section 262 
(Privilege Created by Public Necessity), which pertains to trespass to chat-
tel rather than to land: “One is privileged to commit an act which would 
otherwise be a trespass to chattel or a conversion if the act is or is 
reasonably believed to be necessary for the purpose of avoiding a public 
disaster.”327 
The comments to Section 196, dealing with the privilege to enter land 
in the possession of another, are applicable also to Section 262.328  Com-
ment b of Section 262 states that the privilege in this section “is applicable 
where one intermeddles with chattels in the possession of another in a 
reasonable effort to protect against a public enemy, or to prevent or mitigate 
the effect of conflagration, flood, earthquake, or pestilence.”329 
 
323. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 201,  at § 24. 
324. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 196 & 262). 
325. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 (1965). 
326. Id. cmt. a. 
327. Id. § 262. 
328. Id. cmt. a. 
329. Id. cmt. b. 
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There is no litmus test as to what constitutes “public” as opposed to 
“private” necessity.  The distinction is chiefly of importance on the question 
of compensation for damages, discussed below.  Public necessity is 
“[w]here the danger affects the entire community, or so many people that 
the public interest is involved.”330  “The number of persons who must be 
endangered in order to create a public necessity has not been determined by 
the courts.”331 
The concept of public necessity pertains not so much as to who the 
agent is, but the purpose of the act, for the privilege applies to private 
individuals as well as public officials.332  If the public authorities have taken 
control of the situation, it would ordinarily be unreasonable for a private 
individual to attempt to exercise the privilege on his own initiative.  It may 
happen, however, that, in the absence of a public official competent to deal 
with the situation, or when the appropriate official unreasonably refuses to 
act, action by a private individual to avert a public disaster would be 
reasonable.333 
Two broad areas of public necessity will be considered.  One pertains 
to military operations in time of war.  The second area involves emergen-
cies such as fire, pestilence, police activities in apprehending criminal 
suspects, and other exigencies in which government officials or private 
individuals take action to avert a public danger.  But, first, it is necessary to 
consider the issue of compensation in situations of public necessity. 
B. ISSUE OF COMPENSATION 
The question of compensation for the destruction or appropriation of 
property in situations of public necessity is complex.  The majority view is 
that there is no duty to pay compensation to the owner of any property 
when the action is taken based on public necessity.334  There are, however, 
numerous exceptions. 
 
330. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., supra note 201, at § 24. 
331. Id. 
332. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 262 cmt. b. (1965). 
333. Id. § 196 cmt. e. 
334. See id. § 262 cmt. d (“Since the privilege stated in this Section arises only because of 
public necessity, the actor is not liable for the harm caused by its proper exercise.”); see also 
Surocco v. Geary, 3 Cal. 70, 74 (1853) (holding that the government was not liable for the costs of 
destroying buildings to prevent the spread of a fire); Seavey v. Preble, 64 Me. 120-22 (1874) 
(holding that the government was not liable for the costs of destroying wallpaper in the homes of 
smallpox victims); Putnam v. Payne, 13 Johns. 312, 312 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (holding that the 
government was not liable for the costs of destroying mad dogs).  Government destruction of 
property also does not give rise to any constitutional claim for compensation against state 
governments under the Fourteenth Amendment.  See Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 280 (1928) 
(holding that Virginia did not have to compensate owners of cedar trees destroyed to save apple 
      
692 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83:651 
There are three broad areas on the question of compensation in situa-
tions of public necessity. The first area involves the seizure or destruction 
of property by the military.  There are two types of military activity for 
purposes of evaluating the right of compensation: If the loss is occasioned 
by combat activity, or to impede the advance of a hostile army (e.g., 
breaking up of roads or burning of bridges), or to destroy food or liquor 
supplies that the enemy might utilize, there is generally no right of 
compensation for the aggrieved party.335  On the other hand, if the military 
appropriates property for its subsequent use (e.g., taking vessels to transport 
military supplies, or seizing buildings to use as storehouses of war material 
or to house soldiers), courts are inclined to award compensation for the 
loss.336  In the latter situations, the courts generally find there is a “qualified 
privilege” for the military to appropriate the property based on necessity, 
but a corresponding duty for the government to compensate the owner.  
Compensation in such situations is not based on the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, but on the theory of implied promise on the part of the 
government to pay a reasonable compensation for the property taken or 
destroyed.337 
Second, if the property that is damaged or seized itself had become 
dangerous and was likely to have been destroyed anyway, the aggrieved 
party is not entitled to compensation.338  Cases of this sort might involve a 
fire or other danger in which the property destroyed “had temporarily be-
come dangerous itself and was likely to have been destroyed anyway.”339 
A third area involves police activity—e.g., firing tear gas into a 
building in order to flush out criminal suspects, in turn causing damage to 
the property.340  There is generally no right of compensation so long as the 
police acted reasonably, but there are some exceptions.341 
In situations of public necessity where there is no legal obligation to 
pay compensation for the destruction of property, there is an exception if 
the entry and the action taken were unreasonable under the 
 
trees because “preferment of [the public] interest over the property interest of the individual, to the 
extent even of its destruction, is one of the distinguishing characteristics of every exercise of 
police power which affects property”).  All of the cases just mentioned are discussed in Part III.D.  
infra. 




339. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., supra note 201, at § 24. 
340. See discussion in Section D infra. 
341. See, e.g., Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 479 N.W.2d 38 (Minn. 1991) (holding 
that doctrine of public necessity did not insulate municipality to pay just compensation to home-
owner who suffered property damages after police fired tear gas into his home). 
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circumstances.342  The exception also applies if the actor failed to use 
reasonable care to avoid doing unnecessary harm to persons or things, 
“although the exigencies of the occasion must be taken into account in 
judging his conduct.”343  Many believe that there is or should be a moral 
obligation for public authorities to provide compensation to an aggrieved 
party whose property has been destroyed by public necessity.  Section 196 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts expresses this view: 
Although the moral obligation to compensate the person whose 
property has been damaged or destroyed for the public good is 
obviously very great, and is of the kind which should be recog-
nized by the law, the rules as to governmental immunity from suit 
have stood in the past as a barrier to any effective legal remedy.  
After major public disasters compensation often has been paid 
under special legislation enacted for the purpose, and in several 
jurisdictions general statutes provide for such compensation.344 
Some jurisdictions have enacted statutes which provide for compen-
sation in certain situations “where property is destroyed on grounds of 
public necessity.”345  For instance, in Mayor of New York v. Lord,346 the 
court discussed a municipal ordinance in New York passed in 1806, which 
directed the mayor to compensate property owners whose property was 
destroyed at the mayor’s direction to prevent the spread of fire.347  The 
basis for such compensation is that the government has a moral obligation, 
albeit not a legal one, to provide compensation in certain instances when 
private property is destroyed due to public necessity.348 
In some situations where the destruction or property occurs pursuant to 
government authority, plaintiffs have successfully argued that the Takings 
 
342. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 196 cmt. e (1965). 
343. Id. cmt. e. 
344. Id. cmt. h.  
345. See Christie, supra note 89, at 996.  In addition, numerous states have statutorily 
authorized reimbursement programs for damage to property of innocent residents caused by the 
police engaged in apprehending suspects.  See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 29631 (“The Legislature 
hereby declares that it serves a public purpose, and is of benefit to the state and to every county 
and city in the state, to indemnify those innocent residents of the State of California whose 
property has been injured or destroyed as a result of the acts specified in Section 29632.”). 
The legislative body of a county or of a city may establish a program which provides 
for the reimbursement of any innocent resident . . . whose property is or has been . . . 
injured or destroyed as the consequences of: (a) An act of a peace officer in the 
detection of crime or the apprehension or arrest of any person for any public offense; 
or (b) An act of a person in resisting or avoiding arrest. 
Id. § 29632. 
346. 17 Wend. (N.Y.) 285 (1837). 
347. Lord, 17 Wend. at 285. 
348. Id. 
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Clause of the Fifth Amendment, in the case of the federal government, or 
the comparable provisions applicable to the states under the 14th Amend-
ment, require compensation.  The Takings Clause was “designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, 
in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”349  
Where plaintiffs have won awards of compensation, under one theory or 
another, usually property was taken or destroyed, but the property was not a 
part of the threatened danger and was not itself likely to be harmed or 
destroyed. 
C. MILITARY NECESSITY IN SEIZING OR DESTROYING PROPERTY IN 
TIME OF WAR 
Generally, the destruction of private property caused by military oper-
ations during war is not subject to compensation under the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.350  Examples of losses occasioned by government 
troops in the operations of war include destroying bridges to prevent the 
enemy from crossing them, destroying storehouses to prevent their being of 
use to the enemy, seizing and destroying other types of private property so 
as to prevent it from falling into the hands of enemies, taking other 
measures for the safety and efficiency of troops, and other necessary and 
unavoidable destruction of property from the ravages of war.351 
In United States v. Caltex, Inc.,352 the Supreme Court held that the 
wartime destruction of private property by the Army to prevent its immi-
nent capture and use by an advancing enemy did not entitle the owner to 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.353  The case involved orders to 
demolish the facilities of an oil company terminal in the Philippines in 
December, 1941, at a time when Japanese troops were invading Manila.354  
The demolition rendered the facilities useless by the enemy, and the enemy 
was thus deprived of a valuable logistic weapon.355  The issue before the 
Court was whether the Government must compensate the owner of the 
property for its destruction.356  The sole objective of the Army was to 
 
349. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  For a general discussion of the 
purposes of the Just Compensation Clause, see Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and 
Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV L. REV. 
1165, 1165 (1967). 
350. See discussion infra. 
351. Id. 
352. 344 U.S. 149 (1952). 
353. Caltex, 344 U.S. at 156. 
354. Id. at 150-51. 
355. Id. at 151. 
356. Id. at 152. 
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destroy property of strategic value to prevent the enemy from using it to 
wage war more successfully.357 
The Court found, by a seven-to-two vote, that “the common law had 
long recognized that in times of imminent peril—such as when fire 
threatened a whole community—the sovereign could, with immunity, de-
stroy the property of a few that the property of many and the lives of many 
more could be saved.”358  Justices Douglas and Black dissented, stating that 
while there is no doubt that the military has authority to select certain 
property for destruction to prevent the enemy from using it, the Fifth 
Amendment requires compensation for the taking.359  “Whenever the Gov-
ernment determines that one person’s property—whatever it may be—is 
essential to the war effort and appropriates it for the common good, the 
public purse, rather than the individual, should bear the loss.”360  This view 
seems to be supported by Vattel, who in his Law of Nations, discussed 
damages sustained by individuals in war.361  He noted Grotius indicated to a 
split of opinion on this question.362  According to Vattel, there are two 
kinds of damages to be distinguished.363  The state is not required to 
indemnify those who suffer damages done by inevitable necessity, the 
havoc done by the artillery in engagements and other calamities arising 
from action in the field.364  In these cases 
the public finances would be soon exhausted.  Every one must 
contribute his share in due proportion, which would be impracti-
cable.  Besides, these indemnifications would be liable to a thou-
sand abuses, and there would be no end of the particulars; it is 
therefore to be supposed that no such thing was ever meant by 
those who formed a society.365 
On the other hand, Vattel appears to agree with the dissenting opinion 
in Caltex that, with respect to military action by the state 
done voluntarily and by precaution, as when a field, a house, or 
garden, belonging to a private person, is made use of for building 
the rampart of a town, or some other piece of fortification; when 
 
357. Id. at 153. 
358. Id. at 154. 
359. Id. at 156 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
360. Id. 
361. M.D. VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, Book III, ch. 15, § 232 (Simeon Butler, 
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his standing corn, or his store houses are destroyed to prevent their 
being of use to the enemy.  Such damages are to be made good to 
the owner, who should bear only his quota.366 
Perhaps the case mainly hinged on the distinction between 
“destruction” and “use.”  Because the claimant’s property was demolished 
in order to prevent capture by the enemy, rather than appropriated for 
subsequent use, the Court refused to grant compensation.367  Perhaps this is 
a nonsensical distinction—that between destroying property of strategic 
value and taking property for subsequent use by the military.  In either 
instance, the owner has been deprived of property. 
The Caltex case distinguished Mitchell v. Harmony,368 in which the 
Supreme Court considered the necessity doctrine in connection with the 
appropriation of property for subsequent use in a military campaign.369  The 
question in Mitchell was under what circumstances private property may be 
taken from the owner by a military officer in a time of war.370  More 
specifically, the question was whether a military officer might take private 
property simply to insure the success of any military enterprise that a 
commanding officer may deem advisable to undertake against the enemy.371 
The case involved the seizure of mules, wagons and goods of an 
American merchant who was headed to Mexico just before the war 
commenced between the United States and Mexico.372  The merchant was 
forced to accompany American troops against his will, together with his 
goods, which eventually were disposed of in Mexico by order of the 
commander of the American forces.373 
The commander sought to justify the seizure, in part, to prevent the 
property from falling into the hands of the enemy.374  In addition, he sought 
to justify the seizure based on the assertion that it would ensure the success 
of the expedition upon which the commander was embarking.375  At trial, 




367. United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149, 156 (1952). 
368. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1851). 
369. Mitchell, 54 U.S. at 133. 
370. Id. at 134. 
371. Id. 
372. Id. at 129. 
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375. Id. 
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On review, the Supreme Court stated that the necessity doctrine allows 
for property to be seized for public use “in case of an immediate and 
pressing danger or urgent necessity existing at the time, but not other-
wise.”377  The Court found, “the property was seized not to defend [the 
troops’] position, nor to place the troops in a safer one, nor to anticipate the 
attack of an approaching enemy, but to insure the success of a distant and 
hazardous expedition some time” in the future.378 
In regard to the powers of a military commander, the Court stated: 
But it must be remembered that the question here, is not as to the 
discretion he may exercise in his military operations or in relation 
to those who are under his command.  His distance from home, 
and the duties in which he is engaged, cannot enlarge his power 
over the property of a citizen, nor give to him, in that respect, any 
authority which he would not, under similar circumstances, 
possess at home.  And where the owner has done nothing to forfeit 
his rights, every public officer is bound to respect then, whether he 
finds the property in a foreign or hostile country, or in his own. 
There are, without doubt, occasions in which private property may 
lawfully be taken possession of or destroyed to prevent it from 
falling into the hands of the public enemy; and also where a 
military officer, charged with a particular duty, may impress 
private property into the public service or take it for public use.  
Unquestionably, in such cases, the government is bound to make 
full compensation to the owner; but the officer is not a trespasser. 
But we are clearly of opinion, that in all of these cases the danger 
must be immediate and impending; or the necessity urgent for the 
public service, such as will not admit of delay, and where the 
action of the civil authority would be too late in providing the 
means which the occasion calls for.  It is impossible to define the 
particular circumstances of danger or necessity in which this 
power may be lawfully exercised.  Every case must depend on its 
own circumstances.  It is the emergency that gives the right, and 
the emergency must be shown to exist before the taking can be 
justified.379 
The Court concluded that there was no public necessity in the taking of 
the private property under the circumstances of the Mexican campaign, and 
 
377. Id. 
378. Id. at 135. 
379. Id. at 134. 
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that the owner should be compensated.380  The Court pointed out that the 
standard for determining if a necessity exists is one of reasonableness: 
In deciding upon this necessity . . . the state of the facts, as they 
appeared to the officer at the time he acted, must govern the 
decision; for he must necessarily act upon the information of 
others as well as his own observation.  And if, with such informa-
tion as he had a right to rely upon, there is reasonable ground for 
believing that the peril is immediate and menacing, or the neces-
sity urgent, he is justified in acting upon it; and the discovery 
afterwards that it was false or erroneous, will not make him a 
trespasser.  But it is not sufficient to show that he exercised an 
honest judgment, and took the property to promote the public 
service; he must show by proof the nature and character of the 
emergency, such as he had reasonable grounds to believe it to be, 
and it is then for a jury to say, whether it was so pressing as not to 
admit of delay; and the occasion such, according to the 
information upon which he acted, that private rights must for the 
time give way to the common and public good.381 
The Mitchell Court made reference to a 1774 English case, Mostyn v. 
Fabrigas.382  Lord Mansfield, in writing the decision in Mostyn, referred to 
an unpublished case against Captain Gambier of the British Navy who, 
following orders, “pulled down the houses of some sutlers on the coast of 
Nova Scotia who were supplying sailors with . . . liquor.”383  Lord 
Mansfield found that the action was done “with a good intention . . . for the 
health of the sailors was affected” by frequenting the houses where liquor 
was offered.384  The Supreme Court, in commenting on Captain Gambier’s 
action, concluded that the action was “evidently a laudable one” in that it 
performed a public service in the protection of the morals of the sailors.385  
However, one of the sutlers whose house had been destroyed sued Captain 
Gambier in England, and a thousand pounds damages were awarded against 
the Captain.386  The Supreme Court, in noting this result with approval, 
 
380. Id. at 137. 
381. Id. at 135. 
382. Id. 
383. Id. at 135-36. 
384. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161, 180 (1774). 
385. Mitchell, 54 U.S. at 136 
386. See Mostyn, 1 Cowp. at 181. 
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stated that Captain Gambier’s action “was an invasion of the rights of 
private property, and without the authority of law.”387 
President Grant, eighty years before the Caltex decision, vetoed a bill 
of Congress that originated in the Senate Committee on Claims, which 
authorized compensation for a house and its contents that had been ordered 
destroyed by the commanding officer of the Union forces “in defense of the 
city of Paducah, Kentucky, in March, 1864.”388  The city was under siege 
by the Confederates.389  Federal troops retreated to Fort Anderson for 
protection.390  Confederate sharpshooters seized possession of the claim-
ant’s house, which was about one hundred and fifty yards from the fort, and 
fired on the fort late into the night, but Union fire managed to drive them 
away from the house.391  Anticipating that the Confederate forces would 
appear with reinforcements in the morning to continue their assault, the 
Union officer in command gave orders for “the destruction of all houses 
within musket-range of the fort,” including the claimant’s house.392  The 
purpose was to prevent the reinforced Confederate soldiers from taking 
positions in the houses.393  The Senate Committee on Claims concluded that 
the “burning of the house to prevent its being used by the sharp-shooters of 
the enemy was a taking by the government of private property for public 
use, for which compensation should be made.”394 
President Grant declared in his veto message that the payment of this 
claim would invite the presentation of demands for very large sums of 
money against the government for necessary and unavoidable destruction of 
property by the army.  According to him, 
[i]t is a general principle of both international and municipal law 
that all property is held subject, not only to be taken by the govern-
ment for public uses, in which case, under the Constitution of the 
United States, the owner is entitled to just compensation, but also 
subject to be temporarily occupied, or even actually destroyed, in 
times of great public danger, and when the public safety demands 
it; and in this latter case governments do not admit a legal 
obligation on their part to compensate the owner.  The temporary 
 
387. Mitchell, 54 U.S. at 136. Lord Mansfield, commenting about the case of Captain 
Gambier, said that the decision was “very likely erroneous.”  Mostyn, 1 Cowp. at 181. 
388. United States v. Pac. R.R., 120 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1881). 
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occupation of, injuries to, and destruction of property caused by 
actual and necessary military operations, is generally considered to 
fall within the last-mentioned principle.  If a government makes 
compensation under such circumstances, it is a matter of bounty 
rather than of strict legal right.395 
It seems that the reasoning of President Grant in this veto message is 
consistent with the principles set forth in Caltex.  In both situations, the 
property was destroyed at a time of great public danger, as part of military 
operations to prevent the enemy from gaining a strategic advantage. 
The notion that the sovereign has the right to destroy private property 
in times of great public danger when the public safety demands it, seems to 
have gotten its initial imprimatur in a 1606 English ruling known as the 
Saltpeter Case.396  This case dealt with the right of the sovereign to utilize 
private property for defense purposes in time of war.397  The question was 
what prerogative the King had in digging and taking of saltpeter from the 
freehold estates of subjects, to make gunpowder to be used in defense of the 
realm.398  The objective was to avoid having to buy saltpeter in foreign 
countries because of the difficulty involved.399  The case discussed the 
principle that if enemies come upon coastal lands, the King has the right to 
make trenches or bulwarks for the defense of the realm because this is for 
the public benefit.400  In doing so, the King must take care not to “under-
mine, weaken, or impair any of the walls or foundations of any houses” or 
“barns, stables, dove-houses, mills, or any other buildings.”401  The court 
also laid out guidelines to be observed by the King’s workers in digging up 
saltpeter—such as restoring the property to good condition after digging, 
and working only between sunrise and sunset.402 
Harrison v. Wisdom403 involved the defense of public necessity as-
serted by private individuals (rather than public officials) to justify the 
destruction of private stores of liquor before an invading army entered the 
city.404  This case, decided by a Tennessee court, is similar to the Captain 
Gambier situation mentioned above, except that here the liquor was 
 
395. Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 4155 (1872) (veto message of President 
Ulysses S. Grant, Cong. Globe). 
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destroyed to prevent the enemy, rather than one’s own soldiers, from 
getting to the liquor supply. 
In February 1862, citizens of Clarksville, Tennessee, convened a 
meeting to see what they could do to protect themselves in anticipation of 
an immediate invasion by the Union Army.405  The citizens believed they 
needed to act on their own based on public necessity inasmuch as the 
municipal government had collapsed.406  Fort Donelson, only thirty miles 
away, had capitulated to the Federal forces.407  At the time there was a large 
quantity of whiskey and other liquor in the hands of merchants and dealers 
in Clarksville, and the people feared that if it should fall into the hands of 
the Federal soldiers, “then flushed with victory and inflamed with the evil 
passions of civil war,” their lives would be in peril.408 
The choice of evils was either to destroy the liquor supply or to allow 
the soldiers to find it, with the likely outcome that they would get 
intoxicated and excessively rowdy.  The people thus decided to destroy the 
liquor stocks, and to levy a special tax in order to raise a fund to reimburse 
those whose property was thus destroyed.409  Later, one merchant (appar-
ently who had not been reimbursed) sued some of the citizens who partic-
ipated in the destruction of the liquor, to recover damages.410  Apparently 
the other merchants filed separate lawsuits.411 
The judge instructed the jury as follows: 
If it appears the destruction of the whiskey was done under the 
belief that it was necessary to the safety of the public, that is a 
question resting with you from the proof.  Whether that the danger 
was imminent and impending, or that the citizens had reasonable 
grounds to believe that the destruction of the property was neces-
sary for the public safety, to ascertain that you will look to the 
proof.  In arriving at your conclusion on this point you will look to 
the state and condition of the country, the fall of fort Donelson, the 
advance of the hostile forces, the nature of the property destroyed, 
its effects upon men, and the consequences that might result from 








411. See id. at *2.  It was noted in the appeal that the trial judge had been present at the 
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are satisfied that the danger was imminent and impending, and the 
destruction of the property a public necessity for the safety of the 
public, then the defendants were justified in its destruction. . . .  It 
must not be imaginary, but real danger to the public, as stated.412 
The jury found in favor of the defendants, based on public necessity.413  No 
damages were awarded for the loss of property.414  The appellate court up-
held the verdict and pronounced that the right to destroy property in cases 
of extreme emergency may be exercised by individuals in any proper case, 
free from all liability for the value of the property destroyed.415  The court 
noted that the usual cases of public necessity are “to prevent the spread of a 
fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a hostile army, or any other 
great public calamity.”416  The court reasoned that the advance of a hostile 
army is “among the exigencies when such a necessity might exist to justify 
the destruction of private property.”417 
Another case of military necessity in which an aggrieved landowner 
was denied compensation involved the following facts: During the invasion 
of the British in 1814-15, in order to prevent the British troops from 
bringing up munitions to the city of New Orleans, a commanding officer 
caused a levee to be cut through, and this in turn inundated the plantation of 
a citizen.  The inundation remained until the departure of the invading 
army, and caused destruction of crops and expenses on the claimant’s part 
to repair the levee.  The losses were denied on the grounds that they were 
sustained in the necessary operations of war, for which the United States 
was not liable.418 
United States v. Pacific Railroad Co.419 was another case in which a 
claimant was denied compensation for property that was destroyed due to 
military necessity.  In this case, Union Army forces during the Civil War 
destroyed bridges of a railroad company as they retreated, in order to 
impede the advance of the Confederate Army.420  The railroad sued the 
government for damages.421  The Supreme Court held that this act did not 
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constitute a compensable taking by the United States under the Fifth 
Amendment: 
The destruction or injury of private property in battle, or in the 
bombardment of cities and towns, and in many other ways in the 
war, had to be borne by the sufferers alone as one of its conse-
quences.  Whatever would embarrass or impede the advance of the 
enemy, as the breaking up of roads, or the burning of bridges, or 
would cripple and defeat him, as destroying his means of 
subsistence, were lawfully ordered by the commanding general.  
Indeed, it was his imperative duty to direct their destruction.  The 
necessities of the war called for and justified this.  The safety of 
the state in such cases overrides all considerations of private 
loss.422 
The Court added: 
The principle that, for injuries to or destruction of private property 
in necessary military operations during the civil war, the govern-
ment is not responsible, is thus considered established.  Compen-
sation has been made in several such cases, it is true; but it has 
generally been . . . “a matter of bounty rather than of strict legal 
right.”423 
The Court distinguished situations involving the destruction of 
property during battle and supportive maneuvers due to military necessity, 
and the appropriation of property for the use by the military, 
where property of loyal citizens is taken for the service of our 
armies, such as vessels, steam-boats, and the like, for the transport 
of troops and munitions of war; or buildings to be used as 
storehouses and places of deposit of war material, or to house 
soldiers or take care of the sick, or claims for supplies seized and 
appropriated.  In such cases, it has been the practice of the 
government to make compensation for the property taken.  Its 
obligation to do so is supposed to rest upon the general principle of 
justice that compensation should be made where private property 
is taken for public use, although the seizure and appropriation of 
private property under such circumstances by the military 
authorities may not be within the terms of the constitutional 
clause.424 
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Where, as pointed out above, the Government should pay compensation for 
the appropriation of property for the service of the military, the compen-
sation is apparently not based on the Takings Clause but on the principle of 
implied promise in contract law.  This principle was set forth in an 1871 
Supreme Court case, United States v. Russell.425  The case involved the 
seizure, pursuant to military order, of three steamboats owned by Russell, 
by the Union Army during the Civil War.426  The boats were used to carry 
government freight in furtherance of the war effort.427  Following this ser-
vice, the vessels were returned to the owner.428  The owner sued the govern-
ment for compensation for the use of his steamboats.429  The Supreme Court 
said that clearly the emergency was such that officers were justified in 
ordering the steamboats into the service of the United States, due to 
“imperative military necessity.”430 
Extraordinary and unforeseen occasions arise . . . beyond all doubt, 
in cases of extreme necessity in time of war or of immediate and 
impending public danger, in which private property may be im-
pressed into the public service, or may be seized and appropriated 
to the public use, or may even be destroyed without the consent of 
the owner.431 
The Court added: 
Such a taking of private property by the government, when the 
emergency of the public service in time of war or impending 
public danger is too urgent to admit of delay, is everywhere 
regarded as justified, if the necessity for the use of the property is 
imperative and immediate, and the danger, as heretofore described, 
is impending, and it is equally clear that the taking of such 
property under such circumstances creates an obligation on the 
part of the government to reimburse the owner to the full value of 
the service.  Private rights, under such extreme and imperious 
circumstances, must give way for the time to the public good, but 
the government must make full restitution for the sacrifice.432 
 
425. 80 U.S. 623 (1871). 
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Thus, the Court ordered that damages be paid to reimburse the owner 
for the use of the steamboats, for his own services and expenses in 
navigating them, and for the crews provided in transporting government 
freight.433  The Court based its decision not on the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, but on the theory of implied promise on the part of the 
United States to pay a reasonable compensation for the services rendered.434 
Another case involving the destruction of property due to military 
necessity was Juragua Iron Co. v. United States,435 in which the Supreme 
Court denied recovery to the American owners of a factory that had been 
destroyed by American soldiers in Cuba because it was thought that the 
structure housed the germs of a contagious disease.436  United States troops, 
during the war with Spain in 1898, were engaged in military operations in 
Cuba, and sought to prevent the spread of yellow fever, which threatened 
the lives of United States troops, by destroying all buildings which might 
contain the fever germs.437  Various structures owned by the claimant, who 
owned an iron works facility and numerous dwellings occupied by its 
employees, were destroyed by order to the commanding officer by the 
advice of his medical staff.438  The Court held that the destruction of the 
property was a necessity of war, required for the health and safety of the 
troops at that location, and did not give rise to a legal right of 
compensation.439 
The Court mentioned that its ruling applied despite the fact that the 
property appropriated for military use was owned by an American citizen, 
and that the case was governed by the general rule that property found in 
enemy territory is enemy property regardless of the status of the owner.440  
The Court of Claims, which initially decided the Juragua case, stated in its 
opinion: 
The law seems to be well settled that when a citizen of one 
belligerent country is doing business in the other belligerent coun-
try, and has built up and purchased property there which has a 
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permanent situs, such property is subject to the same treatment as 
property of the enemy.441 
The Supreme Court emphatically affirmed that idea: 
The plaintiff, although an American corporation, doing business in 
Cuba, was, during the war with Spain, to be deemed an enemy to 
the United States with respect of its property found and then used 
in that country, and such property could be regarded as enemy’s 
property, liable to be seized and confiscated by the United States 
in the progress of the war then being prosecuted; indeed, subject 
under the laws of war to be destroyed whenever, in the conduct of 
military operations, its destruction was necessary for the safety of 
our troops or to weaken the power of the enemy.442 
We might observe that this case seems to depart from the Mostyn case, 
mentioned above, in which Captain Gambier had to pay damages to a 
claimant for the destruction of a house in which liquor was served to the 
troops.  In both the Mostyn case and the Juragua Iron case, the destruction 
of property was accomplished for the health and welfare of the troops. 
In Aris Gloves, Inc. v. United States,443 an American corporation 
owning three glove manufacturing plants liberated by the U.S. Army in East 
Germany, sued in the Court of Claims for compensation after the Govern-
ment handed over the plants to Russia and Czechoslovakia as part of an 
agreement for the division of German territory in August, 1945.444  The 
properties were seized by the Germans on the ground that they were United 
States enemy property.445  “Toward the end of the war, . . . the territory in 
which plaintiff’s three plants were located was liberated from German 
occupation” and came under the authority of the United States Military 
Command.446  Thereafter, the area encompassing one of plaintiff’s plants 
was incorporated into the Russian zone of occupation, and under the 
Potsdam Agreement Russia was authorized to dismantle and remove all 
industrial equipment therein.447  The two other plants of the plaintiff, 
located in Czechoslovakia, came under control of Czechoslovakia and when 
a Communist regime took control of the government, these two plants were 
nationalized.448  Thus, all three of plaintiff’s manufacturing plants were 
 
441. Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 42 Ct. Cl. 99, 1907 WL 886, at *9 (Jan. 28, 1907). 
442. Juragua Iron Co., 212 U.S. at 306. 
443. 420 F.2d 1386 (Ct. Cl. 1970). 
444. Aris Gloves, 420 F.2d at 1387-88. 




      
2007] VIOLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 707 
confiscated and transferred away by the United States as a kind of war 
booty, “but without the payment of any compensation by any of the three 
countries involved (Germany, Russia, or Czechoslovakia).”449 
The plaintiff contended that the above set of circumstances amounted 
to taking of its property by the Government without just compensation.450  
It was plaintiff’s position that the Government “should be obliged to 
compensate it for its losses since defendant failed to protect its property 
interests, and since defendant even went to the point of actually authorizing 
a third party to take control of plaintiff’s property without first requiring 
just compensation.”451 
The Court of Claims agreed that the Government by its action deprived 
the plaintiff of its interest in the property, and enabled Russia and 
Czechoslovakia to obtain the use or benefit of the property, but nonetheless 
the plaintiff was not entitled to recover either under the Fifth Amendment 
or on the basis of an implied contract.452  The main basis for denial of the 
claim was the general rule “that all property located in enemy territory, 
regardless of ownership, is in time of war regarded as enemy property 
subject to the laws of war.”453  At the time of the taking, the United States 
was engaged in a war.  Therefore, the question must be governed by those 
cases which deal with wartime appropriations of private property. 
The court relied heavily on Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, which 
we discussed above.454  The court stated: 
It should be noted further that the Court of Claims in deciding 
Juragua even went to the point of ruling that if the plaintiff’s 
property was not considered as “enemy property,” there would still 
be no means of recovery for the plaintiff since the destruction was 
justified by the necessity of carrying on military operations.455 
The court further stated that “we feel that certain governmental actions 
which might appear to be a taking should not be so labeled when they are 
the result of a wartime situation.”456  As a separate issue, the court said that 
the action was proper even though the war was over.457  According to the 
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court, “The war power continues past the end of hostilities and into that 
period during which the evils which gave rise to the hostilities are sought to 
be remedies.”458 
Another case from World War II, Franco-Italian Packing Co. v. United 
States,459 involved a claim by fishermen who were prevented from carrying 
on their normal fishing operations.460  A fish catching and processing busi-
ness sued for losses resulting when naval officers ordered two of plaintiff’s 
fishing vessels seized and ordered into port at Balboa.461  The issue 
considered by the Court of Claims was whether the actions of U.S. naval 
officers in preventing plaintiff’s ships from continuing fishing operations 
amounted to an appropriation of the ships to which they were entitled to 
compensation under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.462 
Immediately after Pearl Harbor, on December 7, 1941, military and 
naval commanders charged with the defense of the Panama Canal believed 
that the next Japanese attack would be on the Panama Canal.463  They 
decided to secure the western approaches to the Panama Canal to better 
detect the presence of any unknown or unidentified, and presumably hos-
tile, forces in the region.464 
The military command in the region intercepted radio messages from 
tuna clippers, including those of plaintiff, and the messages were trans-
mitted in secret code.465  It was known that companion fishing vessels 
would signal each other when large schools of tuna were located, and the 
use of coded messages was to prevent competitive vessels from coming into 
the location.466  Commanders were further aware that some Japanese na-
tionals were serving on the crews of tuna vessels.467  They therefore 
regarded the fishing vessels with suspicion.468  They believed that Ameri-
cans among the fishing crews might be captured and coerced into providing 
military information to the enemy, and that fishing vessels might be seized 
by the Japanese naval authorities.469  They thus concluded that the fishing 
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vessels in the area constituted a serious threat to the security of the Panama 
Canal.470 
Naval officials issued orders to regard fishing vessels and similar craft 
in offshore water with suspicion, and to search, sink or seize them, as 
justified.471  In addition, it was ordered that all fishing operations in the 
western approaches to the Panama Canal be terminated, and that all fishing 
vessels that remained there be seized and escorted into the Balboa, the 
closest American port, to be inspected and searched and to have their crews 
interrogated.472  It was deemed impractical to engage in a less severe 
course, such as simply searching the vessels at sea and interviewing the 
crews.473  This could subject the naval ships to attack by Japanese sub-
marines while they lay at rest in the waters during such searches.474  On 
December 20, 1941, after the fishing vessels were brought into Balboa, 
orders were given to the captains of the vessels, including the two owned by 
the plaintiff, to leave Balboa Harbor and embark to San Pedro, 
California.475 
The plaintiff sued for damages resulting from its inability to use its 
vessels for fishing purposes.476  The claim was also made for the value of 
fish and other property that were destroyed or jettisoned as a result of the 
termination of its fishing operations, and other damages.477 
The Court of Claims concluded: “The exercise of [the Government’s] 
regulatory and police powers, war powers or emergency powers in cases of 
imminent peril to the general welfare do not fall within the fifth amendment 
limitation, although taking of private property often resulted.”478  The court 
made clear a distinction between an exercise of the eminent domain power, 
which would require compensation under the Fifth Amendment, and an 
exercise of the police power, which does not require compensation.479  
Accordingly, a compensable taking occurs when “a property interest is 
taken from the owner and applied to the public use because the use of such 
property is beneficial to the public,” while in contrast, “in the exercise of 
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upon because his continued use of the property is or would otherwise be 
injurious to the public welfare.”480 
In this case, the ships were not seized or ordered into port for use by 
the United States, “but the action was taken entirely as a defensive 
measure” to defend western approaches to the Panama Canal from enemy 
attack.481  The action was justified because of the sneak attack on Pearl 
Harbor plus the interception of coded messages from the fishing fleet that 
could have been a threat.482 
The court underscored that the action in this case involved necessary 
military measures.483  The actions of the naval officers in interrupting the 
fishing operations were “clearly emergency actions demanded by the cir-
cumstances taken in the national defense, and were completely unrelated to 
a direct appropriation of plaintiff’s property for public use.”484  The court 
noted that none of the property lost by the plaintiff was physically taken by 
naval officers.  The loss of fishing profits was an incidence of the naval 
action.485  The accidental spoilage of fish and destruction of bait were all 
consequential results of the naval actions, but was not a taking that would 
be compensable under the Fifth Amendment.486  The court relied in part on 
the Pacific Railroad case which was discussed above, for the proposition 
that the government was immune from liability for confiscation of private 
property taken and destroyed, where the action was to prevent the property 
from falling into enemy hands, or to protect the health of troops, or as an 
incidental element of defense against hostile attack.487 
In Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co.,488 the Supreme Court 
construed the War-Time Prohibition Act,489 passed on November 11, 1918, 
which prohibited the sale of distilled spirits for beverage purposes until 
such time as the President issues a proclamation indicating the termination 
of demobilization of forces in Germany.490  The purpose of the Act was to 
conserve manpower of the nation and to increase efficiency in the produc-
tion of arms, munitions, ships, food and clothing for the armed forces.  The 
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Kentucky Distilleries and another company sued to have the Act declared 
unconstitutional.491  The Supreme Court considered several issues. 
First, the Court considered whether the Act was void because it takes 
private property for public purposes without compensation, in violation of 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.492  It was argued that Con-
gress, under the war powers granted to it, might temporarily regulate the 
sale of liquor, and even forbid the sale of liquor in order to guard and 
promote the efficiency of the war effort, but not without making 
compensation.493  The Court concluded that “[t]here was no appropriation 
of the liquor for public purposes.”494  The Act simply fixed a period of 
seven months and nine days from its passage during which those engaged in 
the business might dispose of stocks on hand free from any restrictions, 
following which the restrictions took effect.495  The Court said this was a 
reasonable period during which merchants might freely dispose of their 
stocks of distilled spirits.496 
Second, the petitioners also argued that even though the President had 
not issued a proclamation announcing the completion of demobilization of 
forces, the Act had ceased to be valid because in fact the war was over.  The 
Court replied: 
In view of facts of public knowledge . . . that the treaty of peace 
has not yet been concluded, that the railways are still under na-
tional control by virtue of the war powers, that other war activities 
have not been brought to a close, and that it can not even be said 
that the man power of the nation has been restored to a peace 
footing, we are unable to conclude that the act has ceased to be 
valid.497 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer498 is one of the most famous 
cases that pertains to the Korean War.499  In 1951, a dispute between steel 
companies and their employees over new collective bargaining agreements 
threatened to result in a stoppage of steel production.500  To avert a 
nationwide strike, President Harry S. Truman, believing he had inherent 
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powers as President to seize most of the nation’s steel mills to prevent labor 
disputes from stopping steel production, and to thereby avert a national 
catastrophe, issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce 
to take possession of and operate most of the nation’s steel mills.501  The 
order contained a finding that the President’s action was necessary to avoid 
a national catastrophe, because a work stoppage would immediately imperil 
the national defense, and steel production was indispensable to all weapons 
and other materials in the nation’s war effort in Korea.502  The Secretary in 
turn directed the presidents of the various seized companies to serve as 
operating managers for the United States.503  They were directed to carry on 
their activities in accordance with regulations and directions of the 
Secretary.504 
The steel companies sued to challenge the validity of the seizure as not 
authorized by an act of Congress or any constitutional provisions.505  The 
District Court granted a preliminary injunction restraining the Secretary 
from continuing the seizure and possession of the plants and from acting 
under the executive order.506 
The Supreme Court affirmed.  The Court stated, “[t]he President’s 
power, if any, to issue the order must stem either from an act of Congress or 
from the Constitution itself[,]” that Congress had not authorized the sei-
zure,507 and that the President has no constitutional authority under the 
circumstances to seize private property for national defense even though an 
emergency existed.508  The Court suggested that Congress, not the 
President, has authority to condemn a “plant, factory, or industry in order to 
promote industrial peace.”509  Thus, the Court held that the President, as 
Commander-in-Chief, has no ultimate power to take possession of private 
property in order to keep labor disputes from disrupting production of steel 
needed for prosecuting a war; rather, this is a function for the Congress.510 
The Court noted that Congress had explicitly rejected granting 
authority to the President to seize plants in order to deal with labor disputes 
when it enacted the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (the Taft-
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Hartley Act).511  In a concurring opinion, Justice Clark pointed out that, 
instead of seizing the companies, the President could have sought injunctive 
relief under that Act for an eighty-day period against a work stoppage if, in 
his opinion, “a threatened or actual strike affecting an entire industry will, if 
permitted to occur or to continue, imperil the national health or safety.”512  
In the event a strike is not settled within the eighty-day injunction period, 
the Act directs the President to submit to Congress “a full and compre-
hensive report. . . together with such recommendations as he may see fit to 
make for consideration and appropriate action.”513  Congress, in turn, would 
have the opportunity “to determine whether special legislation should be 
enacted to meet the emergency at hand.”514  Congress had authorized a 
procedure which the President declined to follow.515  Thus, the President 
had a reasonable, legal way out of the emergency other than taking the uni-
lateral action he did. 
A principal concern of the steel companies was that even if the 
properties were unlawfully taken by government officials for public use, 
they might be denied compensation for any damages which they would 
suffer.516  They would be denied compensation because prior decisions of 
the Supreme Court had cast doubt on the right to recover in the Court of 
Claims for properties unlawfully taken by government officials for public 
use.517  In addition, the companies were concerned that the seizure “of these 
going businesses were bound to result in many present and future damages 
of such a nature as to be difficult, if not incapable, of measurement.”518 
American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co. v. United States519 also 
involved the destruction of property occasioned by military necessity.520  
The owners of a ship, the S.S. Santo Domingo, sued its insurance company 
to recover for the loss of the ship.521  “The ship was seized by rebels while 
 
511. Id. at 601-02 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
512. Id.  at 663 (Clark, J., concurring) (quoting Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 176). 
513. Id. (quoting Taft-Hartley Act, 29 U.S.C. § 176). 
514. Id. 
515. See id. (“The Selective Service Act of 1948 gives the President specific authority to 
seize plants which fail to produce goods.”). 
516. Id. at 585. 
517. Id.  It seems that the steel companies’ concern here was misplaced.  The two cases they 
cited were Hooe v. United States, 218 U.S. 322 (1910) (denying a claim for rent from the 
Government above and beyond what the Congress had appropriated); and United States v. North 
American Co., 253 U.S. 330 (1920)(allowing a claim for compensation under theory of implied 
promise, after the Secretary of War appropriated claimant’s land to provide quarters for troops, 
but denying interest as not authorized by statute). 
518. Id. 
519. 453 F.2d 1380 (Ct. Cl. 1972). 
520. Am. Mfr. Mut. Ins. Co., 453 F.2d at 1381. 
521. Id. at 1380. 
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in port in the City of Santo Domingo in the Dominican Republic” in 
1965.522  Thereafter, rebels directed small arms and automatic weapon fire 
against soldiers of the United States Army who were occupying parts of the 
city to protect United States citizens.523  “The U.S. army returned the fire 
and sank the ship.”524 
The insurance company defended the suit by claiming that the policy 
contained an exclusion of claims arising from certain acts of the United 
States Government, “to wit: capture, seizure, arrest, restraint, detainment, 
preemption, confiscation, or requisition.”525  The District Court held against 
the insurance company, finding that none of these situations existed.526  The 
company in turn settled the claim by paying the ship owners $800,000.527 
Thereafter the insurance company filed suit against the United States 
for subrogation of the insurance payment, claiming “that the sinking of the 
ship was the taking of private property for public use by the United States 
without just compensation.  The court held that there was no taking of the 
ship by the United States either for public use or otherwise.”528 
Certainly, if the government had intended to use the ship, it would 
not have sunk it.  Also, even if it could be argued that there was a 
taking because of the destruction of the vessel, it was a noncom-
pensable taking.  It is clear that the ship was destroyed in connec-
tion with the carrying on of military operations of the United 
States Army for the protection of its citizens in what amounted to a 
civil war. . . .  In other words, the vessel was destroyed as a part of 
the fortunes of war and by actual and necessary military operations 
in attacking and defending against enemy forces.529 
National Board of YMCAs v. United States,530 involved a “suit against 
the United States for damages done by rioters to buildings occupied by 
United States troops during the riots in Panama on January [9,] 1964.”531  
The riots started when an unruly mob of 1500 people marched into the 
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The petitioner owned two buildings nearby, the YMCA Building and the 
Masonic Temple, which were situated next to each other.533  Members of 
the mob proceeded to the buildings owned by the petitioner, entered them, 
began looting and wrecking the interiors, and started a fire in the YMCA 
Building. 
U.S. Army troops entered the buildings and ejected the rioters.  “The 
mob [then proceeded] to assault the soldiers with rocks, bricks, plate glass, 
Molotov cocktails, and intermittent sniper fire.  The troops moved inside 
the buildings to protect themselves.  The buildings remained under siege 
throughout the night.”534  The next morning the YMCA was set afire from a 
barrage of Molotov cocktails.535  The troops withdrew to the parking lot, 
and then sought protection from the mob in the Masonic Temple.536  The 
mob exerted extensive fire-bomb activity against that structure as well.537  
“On January 13, the mob dispersed.”538  There was extensive damage to the 
YMCA building, and considerable damage to the Masonic building.539 
The troops had entered the petitioner’s buildings in order to protect the 
buildings under attack.540  They expelled the rioters from the buildings, but 
they also were forced to retreat into the buildings.541  The Court articulated 
a “particular intended beneficiary” test for determining whether compensa-
tion was owed under the Fifth Amendment.542  Under the test, when a 
“private party is the particular intended beneficiary of the governmental 
activity, fairness and justice do not require that losses which may result 
from that activity be borne by the public as a whole, even though the 
activity may also be intended incidentally to benefit the public.”543 
According to the Court: 
fairness and justice do not require that losses which may result 
from that activity be borne by the public as a whole, even though 
the activity may also be intended incidentally to benefit the 
public. . . .  Were it otherwise, governmental bodies would be 
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every time policemen break down the doors of buildings to foil 
burglars thought to be inside.544 
The Court added: 
The Constitution does not require compensation every time vio-
lence aimed against government officers damages private property.  
Certainly, the Just Compensation Clause could not successfully be 
invoked in a situation where a rock hurled at a policeman walking 
his beat happens to damage private property.  Similarly, in the in-
stant case, we conclude that the temporary, unplanned occupation 
of petitioners’ buildings in the course of battle does not constitute 
direct and substantial enough government involvement to warrant 
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.545 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart seemed to affirm the general 
principle that the government ordinarily pays for private property used to 
shelter its officials: 
If United States military forces should use a building for their own 
purposes—as a defense bastion or command post, for example—it 
seems to me this would be a Fifth Amendment taking, even though 
the owner himself were not actually deprived of any personal use 
of the building.  Since I do not understand the Court to hold other-
wise, I join its judgment and opinion.546 
Here, the suggestion is that if soldiers use someone’s property to seek 
shelter or as a defensive position, compensation for the taking would be 
required.  This is the same principle as in the Russell case, above, involving 
the appropriation of steamboats to transport military freight. 
Justices Black and Douglas dissented in the YMCA case, arguing that 
the troops indeed moved into these buildings to protect themselves while 
carrying out the mission of safeguarding the entire zone from the rioters.547  
The Army used the buildings as a shelter and fortress, rather than to protect 
the buildings for the good of the owners.548  The occupation of the buildings 
was for the general benefit of the public, that is, for the purpose of pro-
tecting the troops in its effort to thwart the rioters.549  Thus, according to the 
dissent, the Government rather than the individual should bear the loss.550 
 
544. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
545. Id. at 93. 
546. Id. at 94 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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The implication of the ruling is that damage resulting from police 
activity constitutes a compensable taking when the particular intended 
beneficiary of the action is the public as a whole. 
A final case in this section, Westminster Investing Corp. v. G. C. 
Murphy Co.,551  while not involving military action, involved destruction of 
property during riots that followed the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr., in April, 1968.  Property owned by Westminister Investing 
Corporation was destroyed.552  The company sued Murphy, which held a 
lease on the property, and Murphy in turn impleaded the District of 
Columbia, alleging it was liable for negligence and abandonment of duty in 
failing to train its police properly in riot-control methods, and also in failing 
to provide adequate protection during the riots.553  Liability was alleged to 
be “based on the duty of the District of Columbia to protect life and 
property during riots.”554 
The court affirmed the district court’s granting of a motion to dismiss 
the complaints.555  The court stated that it is the “unvarying” rule that “in 
the absence of legislation, municipalities and other governmental bodies are 
not pecuniarily liable for destruction and injury [occasioned by] rioting 
mobs.”556  “No reported case holds a governmental body liable in these cir-
cumstances, or indicates that there could be liability without a statute or 
ordinance.  All the statements by courts are the other way.”557  The court 
noted the problems that might be occasioned even if municipal law 
authorized the imposition of liability: 
Shall responsibility be imposed without fault on the part of the 
governmental entity or only if fault is proved, and if the latter what 
extent of fault should be enough?  If some sort of culpability is 
made a prerequisite, should there be an exception for high-level 
“discretionary” determinations?  Or is it preferable, on the whole, 
to adopt a scheme of participatory insurance?  Shall there be 
recovery for personal injury as well as for property loss?  With 
respect to property damages, what elements should be included—
merely the actual value of lost or destroyed physical property, or 
also lost profits, or business opportunities, and other intangible 
losses?  Is there to be a top limit on awards, either a flat monetary 
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sum or a percentage figure?  Can adequate financial resources for 
the payments be made available?  Shall coverage be extended to 
the victim alone or may his insurer stand in his shoes?  Shall the 
compensation plan be executed through an administrative 
mechanism or shall the courts be used? 558 
The court quoted Justice Harlan in the YMCA case: 
[O]ur decision today does not in any way suggest that the victims 
of civil disturbances are undeserving of relief.  But it is for the 
Congress (or other legislative body), not this Court, to decide the 
extent to which those injured in the riot should be compensated, 
regardless of the extent to which the police or military attempted to 
protect the particular property which each individual owns.559 
The Westminster case also involved a cause of action for “intentional 
abandonment” of duties owed by the municipality to prevent and suppress 
rioting.560  This cause of action alleged damages based on a 
deliberate refusal to [deploy] available police [to] the claimant’s 
[neighborhood,] the allocation of available police resources to 
[other] areas[,] an administrative decision not to use police at a 
certain location because of danger to them or the likelihood of 
increasing or extending the violence[,] . . . and an administrative 
determination that to permit the use of guns would result in too 
many deaths or injuries to rioters.561 
The court concluded, however, that the claim of “intentional abandonment” 
was, as with the other causes of action sounding in negligence, not appro-
priate for the court to resolve without guidance or instruction from legis-
lation on the subject.562 
D. PUBLIC NECESSITY IN DESTROYING PROPERTY BY CIVIL 
AUTHORITIES OR PRIVATE PARTIES 
In this section, cases will be discussed in which individuals have 
sought compensation for damage or destruction of private property justified 
by public necessity.  These are situations involving the police power exer-
cised by the authorities or, in the absence of authorities, by private individ-
uals.  First, situations in which private property has been destroyed to 
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prevent the spread of a fire that threatens a community will be considered.  
Then other situations will be examined, such as the destruction of property 
to avert a flood or to prevent the spread of disease.  Finally, situations in 
which private property has been damaged or destroyed by the police in the 
course of apprehending criminal suspects will be analyzed. 
As will be seen, courts have almost never granted claims for compen-
sation in the proper exercise of police power: 
[I]n its legitimate exercise the police power often works not only 
damage to property, but destruction of property.  Injury to property 
can, and often does, result from the demolition of buildings to 
prevent the spread of conflagration, from the abandonment of an 
existing highway, from the enforced necessity of improving prop-
erty in particular ways to conform to police regulations and 
requirements. . . .  And equally well settled and understood is the 
law that in the exercise of this same power property may in some 
and indeed in many instances be utterly destroyed.  The destruc-
tion of buildings of diseased animals, of rotten fruit, of infected 
trees, are cases that at once come to mind as applicable to both 
personalty and realty.563 
1. Fire Cases 
An area of public necessity involves fire emergencies.  It is clearly the 
right of the authorities as well as private individuals, when a fire threatens a 
whole community, to destroy property of a few to prevent the fire from 
spreading.  To do otherwise is considered a “folly”: 
We find, indeed, a memorable instance of folly recorded in the 3 
Vol. of Clarendon’s History, where it is mentioned, that the Lord 
Mayor of London, in 1666, when that city was on fire, would not 
give directions for, or consent to, the pulling down forty wooden 
houses, or to the removing the furniture, &c. [sic] belonging to the 
Lawyers of the Temple, then on the Circuit, for fear he should be 
answerable for a trespass; and in consequence of this conduct half 
that great city was burnt.564 
In Surocco v. Geary,565 plaintiffs sued for damages for the “blowing up 
with gunpowder, and [destruction of] their house and store, with goods 
 
563. Gray v. Reclamation Dist. No. 1500, 163 P. 1024, 1031 (Cal. 1917). 
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therein[.]”566  The defense argued that to prevent the spread of the fire from 
a public conflagration raging in the city of San Francisco, on Christmas 
Eve, 1849, it was necessary to blow up and thereby destroy plaintiffs’ 
house.567  The evidence showed that the fire was very close to the site of 
plaintiffs’ building and that its destruction was inevitable even if it had not 
been blown up.568  The court reiterated the common law view that such 
destruction, done for the public’s benefit, to prevent a fire from spreading 
over the whole town, is justified, and there is no liability for 
compensation.569 
The right to destroy property, to prevent the spread of a 
conflagration, has been traced to the highest law of necessity, and 
the natural rights of man, independent of society or civil govern-
ment.  It is referred by moralists and jurists to the same great 
principle which justifies the exclusive appropriation of a plank in a 
shipwreck, though the life of another be sacrificed; with the 
throwing overboard goods in a tempest, for the safety of a vessel; 
with the trespassing upon the lands of another, to escape death by 
an enemy. . . .  A house on fire, or those in its immediate vicinity, 
which serve to communicate the flames, becomes a nuisance, 
which it is lawful to abate, and the private rights of the individual 
yield to the considerations of general convenience, and the 
interests of society.  Were it otherwise, one stubborn person might 
involve a whole city in ruin, by refusing to allow the destruction of 
a building which would cut off the flames and check the progress 
of the fire, and that, too, when it was perfectly evident that his 
building must be consumed.570 
Often enough, in cases of destruction of buildings based on public 
necessity to prevent the spread of fire, the structures were likely to have 
been destroyed anyway, but the necessitous action destroyed them sooner 
than otherwise might have been the case.571  If the plaintiff can show that 
the destruction would not otherwise have occurred, or that the necessity of 
the destruction was not sufficiently imminent to justify the action taken, the 
plaintiff might win damages.572 
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For example, Bishop & Parsons v. Mayor of Macon573 involved a fire 
that broke out in the city of Macon, Georgia in August 1844.574  The Mayor 
directed that plaintiff’s building be blown up in order to arrest the spread of 
the fire.575  Plaintiff contended that this was done prematurely, and that 
plaintiff was thereby prevented from removing numerous goods, wares and 
merchandise from the building and saving them.576 
To begin with, the court expressed the erroneous view that the 
aggrieved party is entitled to compensation under the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment: 
[I]t is now well settled, that in a case of actual necessity, to prevent 
the spreading of a fire, the ravages of a pestilence, the advance of a 
hostile army, or any other great public calamity, the private prop-
erty of an individual may be lawfully taken, and used or destroyed 
for the relief, protection or safety of the many.  And in all such 
cases—while the agents of the public who officiate are protected 
from individual liability, the sufferers are nevertheless entitled, 
under the Constitution, to just compensation from the public for 
the loss.577 
This portion of the opinion is flatly at odds with the general principles of 
compensation that we discussed in Part B., that an aggrieved party is not 
entitled to compensation for damages occasioned by acts of public 
necessity.578 
The court noted further that, where as a necessary result of the fire or 
other public calamity the property would have been destroyed in any event, 
the plaintiff would not be entitled to compensation for blowing up the 
building before the principal fire reached it.579  In this case, the fire would 
have destroyed plaintiff’s building even if the actors had not ordered it 
destroyed before the fire came upon that location.580  However, the plaintiff 
sought to prove that the blowing up of the building was premature, that 
plaintiff and his servants and friends, who had been removing various 
goods from the building, were told to evacuate it because they were advised 
the building was going to be blown up right away.581  However, in fact 
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there was about an hour to spare until the fire would have reached the 
adjacent structure, so the plaintiff would have had sufficient time to remove 
valuable goods from the premises.582  The imminence of the danger was 
remote enough that the action could well have been deferred, at least for up 
to an hour, and the plaintiff in turn could well have saved a significant 
portion of the property within the structure that got destroyed.583 
The court remanded the case for a new trial so that the jury could 
consider the amount of damages for the loss of plaintiff’s goods, according 
to proof.584  However, it appears clear that the plaintiff in this case would 
not be entitled to compensation for loss of the structure itself since in any 
case it would have been burned by the natural progression of the fire.585 
In an unusual and bitterly contested fire case from England, a divided 
appeals court in Cope v. Sharpe,586 reversed the trial court and ordered 
judgment to be entered for the defendant based on the necessity doctrine.587  
The plaintiff, the landowner, sued the defendant, who had hunting rights to 
plaintiff’s property, alleging damages for trespass from a backfire that the 
defendant’s gamekeeper started in April 1909.588  After a serious heath fire 
had erupted on plaintiff’s property, about fifty men were engaged in trying 
to stop it.589  The gamekeeper started a backfire some distance away in an 
effort to prevent the main fire from spreading.590  Soon afterwards the main 
fire was extinguished.591  Meanwhile, the backfire spread and caused 
damages to the plaintiff’s lands.592 
After three trials in which there were two mistrials, the jury returned a 
verdict finding gamekeeper’s acts were not in fact necessary for the protec-
tion of the property.593  The jury determined that the fire would have been 
extinguished, and in fact had been extinguished, without the aid of the 
backfire which the defendant had created.594  Had the defendant not started 
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were dousing it and, in the end, the defendant’s backfire caused a net 
increase in damage.595 
The jury also found that the defendant’s acts, while not actually 
necessary, were nonetheless reasonably necessary in the circumstances, as 
suggested in the judge’s instructions.596  That is, the jury found that the 
method adopted by the gamekeeper for the protection of the property was 
reasonably necessary under the circumstances.597  Nonetheless, the trial 
judge held that the method used by the defendant was not in fact necessary, 
and ruled in favor of damages for the plaintiff.598 
The appellate court considered what standard should be applied in 
evaluating the defendant’s gamekeeper’s action in starting the backfire, 
where, as it turned out, it was not in fact necessary to avert a greater 
danger.599  The court held that the action in burning the backfire to prevent 
a larger fire from spreading was justified because it appeared reasonably 
necessary to protect the property from the threatened danger of the larger 
fire, even though it was not in fact necessary to avert the danger, since the 
main fire was soon afterwards extinguished.600 
In the appellate decision, Lord Buckley stated: 
[The jury] affirmed that there was a real and imminent danger 
against which it was necessary to provide, and by the word 
“reasonably” they affirmed that the acts which the defendant did 
were acts reasonably done to meet that real and imminent 
danger. . . .  They found that the defendant’s acts were not in fact 
(i.e., in the result), but were in reason, necessary.601 
Lord Buckley disagreed on the trial judge’s standard and acknowledged that 
if there was a real and imminent danger, the defendant was entitled to act, 
and the test was “whether his acts were reasonably necessary in the sense of 
acts which a reasonable man would properly do to meet a real danger.”602 
In a separate concurring opinion, Lord Kennedy agreed with the 
reasonableness standard in evaluating the actor’s appraisement of the 
necessity to start the backfire: 
[T]ake the case of the jettison of cargo at sea.  Could it properly be 
contended that the legal justification of the jettison depends upon 
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proof that in fact, as things have happened, it was actually neces-
sary for the safety of the adventure, and that a jettison made 
reasonably in order to preserve the adventure from imminent peril 
of destruction in a gale must be held to be unjustifiable, if the 
owner of the goods jettisoned can prove that, after the jettison took 
place, a sudden fall of the wind or a sudden change in its direction 
removed the peril and that, therefore, the adventure would in fact 
have been preserved without the jettison?  In my humble judg-
ment, this question ought to be answered in the negative. . . .603 
Thus, the court held first that the necessity defense applies if the danger 
to be averted exists in fact.  Here, in fact, the heath fire was raging and 
imperiled the surrounding lands—so that, in fact, there was an imminent 
danger that required action.604  Second, the court held that the defendant’s 
action in averting the greater evil was reasonably necessary, and that the 
reasonableness of the action was sufficient to invoke the necessity doctrine, 
even though, in fact, the action turned out to be unnecessary. 
The court suggested in dictum that had the defendant been merely a 
volunteer rather than a lessee, the court would “require very special 
circumstances to justify, on the ground of reasonable necessity, his forcible 
entry into the premises of another against the will of the owner, in order to 
help in extinguishing a fire.”605  This portion of the opinion appears to be 
unsound, and is not generally followed.  As mentioned in the discussion of 
public necessity in section III.A, private individuals as well as public 
authorities are entitled to take reasonable action in the name of public 
necessity,606 including tearing down or destroying buildings.607 
2. Cases Involving Floods, Infectious Disease, and a Mad Dog 
In an 1881 case, Newcomb v. Tisdale,608 the Supreme Court of 
California considered the necessity defense in diverting flood waters.  The 
defendants unlawfully cut a levee off the Sacramento River, causing water 
to flood and “inundate the lands of plaintiffs, and destroy” growing crops of 
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grain.609  The plaintiffs sued for damages, and the defendants raised the 
defense that the levee was cut in order to save life and property.610  The 
evidence indicated that at times the river reached excessive height and 
breaks over its banks, flooding property for miles in extent, endangering the 
lives of the defendants and others.611 
The defendants argued that the river became full to its utmost capacity 
and that it was still rising, that natural outlets to ease the volume of water 
were obstructed, and that its condition was an imminent threat to human 
lives and property in the vicinity.612  The defendants, in order to prevent the 
public calamity, proceeded to remove the obstructions, and in consequence 
of their action, diverted the water, thereby causing other persons’ lands to 
become flooded instead.613 
The trial judge refused to let the jury consider this defense.614  On 
review, it was held that “such necessity existed” and therefore the case 
should have been submitted to the jury.615  The appellate court suggested 
that if, on remand, the jury were to find that the action averted imminent 
peril to lives as well as property, the defendant would not be liable to pay 
compensation for damages.  The majority decision seems consistent with 
the view in section 196 of the Restatement that in situations of public 
necessity, the aggrieved party may not be entitled to compensation for 
damages.616 
There was a dissent in Newcomb, in which the judge did not consider 
this a situation where life was in peril.617  The defendants apparently had 
the time and opportunity to cross a turbulent river in a great flood and take 
the time to cut open the obstruction; they doubtless would have had time to 
remove their families from the area before the lands got inundated.618  The 
dissent suggested that this was not an instance in which the actors sought to 
avert a greater evil, but rather a comparable evil was substituted for the one 
averted.619  The flood waters were simply shifted from one group of 
landowners to another group.620 
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The Supreme Court case of Miller v. Schoene621 involved public 
necessity in destroying trees to prevent the spread of an infectious plant 
disease.622  The facts of the case were as follows: “[A] state entomologist[] 
ordered the plaintiff[] to cut down a large number of ornamental red cedar 
trees growing on [plaintiff’s] property,” in order to prevent the trees from 
spreading an infectious plant disease to the apple orchards within two miles 
of the vicinity.623  The plant disease could be spread by spores from one 
plant to the other over a radius of at least two miles.624  The value of red 
cedar was small as compared with that of the apple orchards of Virginia.625  
The damage to the plaintiff was about $5000 to $7000, while the damage to 
the apple orchards in the vicinity would have been somewhat greater, espe-
cially in view of the importance of the apple industry to the state’s 
economy.  At the time of this case, apple growing was one of the principal 
agricultural pursuits in Virginia.  According to the law under which the 
trees were ordered destroyed, the host trees of a communicable plant 
disease were deemed a public nuisance, subject to destruction.  The law 
provided for procedures for a hearing on the determination of the state 
entomologist, and appellate review.  The Court stated: 
[T]he state was under the necessity of making a choice between 
the preservation of one class of property and that of the other 
wherever both existed in dangerous proximity. . . .  When forced to 
such a choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by 
deciding upon the destruction of one class of property in order to 
save another which, in the judgment of the legislature, is of greater 
value to the public.  It will not do to say that the case is merely one 
of a conflict of two private interests and that the misfortune of 
apple growers may not be shifted to cedar owners by ordering the 
destruction of their property; for it is obvious that there may be, 
and that here there is, a preponderant public concern in the 
preservation of the one interest over the other.626 
The Court added that Virginia did not have to compensate owners of 
cedar trees destroyed to save apple trees because where the public interest is 
concerned, it is one of the distinguishing characteristics of the police power 
to prefer the public interest over the property interest of the individual, “to 
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the extent even of its destruction.”627  According to the Court, the choice of 
protecting the financial prosperity of the apple industry was motivated by 
considerations of social policy, it was not unreasonable, or “unavoidable,” 
and did not involve any denial of due process.628 
In Seavy v. Preble,629 the Supreme Court of Maine considered what 
precautions could be taken to prevent the spread of smallpox or other 
contagious diseases.  The plaintiff was a smallpox patient who sought 
damages against the defendants for trespass and removal of wallpaper in his 
home.  The defendant was the city physician, and there were 107 cases of 
smallpox in the city that winter.  He and other physicians testified that it 
was necessary “in order to cleanse a room in which small-pox patients have 
been confined to remove the paper from the walls.”630  Doctors and nurses 
testified that the wallpaper in the plaintiff’s room, particularly near his bed, 
was soiled and that the patient must have spit a good deal and that his saliva 
soiled the wallpaper.631  The best medical advice at the time suggested the 
necessity of removing the paper and whitewashing the wall with quick-
lime.632  The city physician ordered this in the rooms of other smallpox 
patients as well.633 
The court stated that in order to prevent the spread of smallpox or other 
contagious diseases, 
persons may be seized and restrained of their liberty or ordered to 
leave the state; private houses may be converted into hospitals and 
made subject to hospital regulations; buildings may be broken 
open and infected articles seized and destroyed, and many other 
things done which under ordinary circumstances would be 
considered a gross outrage upon the rights of persons and property.  
This is allowed upon the same principle that houses are allowed to 
be torn down to stop a conflagration.  Salus populi suprema lex—
the safety of the people is the supreme law—is the governing 
principle in such cases.634 
The court added that in determining the extent of precautions to be taken, 
“[i]n all cases of doubt the safest course should be pursued remembering 
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that it is infinitely better to do too much than run the risk of doing too 
little.”635 
In Putnam v. Payne,636 the plaintiff brought an action for damages in 
connection with the killing of his dog.637  The dog was very vicious and had 
frequently attacked persons passing in the street.638  “The plaintiff below 
had frequently been [apprised] of the ferocious acts of his dog, and had 
been requested by [his] neighbors to kill or confine him. . . .  The dog in 
question had been bitten, a few days [earlier,] by a mad dog[,]” which 
perhaps was rabid.639  Because of concerns in the village about mad dogs, 
an ordinance provided for restraining dogs, and it was “lawful for any 
person to kill any dog which should be found at large in the village.”640  
The defendant, “in passing through the village, [saw] the plaintiff’s dog 
running loose and shot him dead.”641  While the action was not taken by a 
government official, it was authorized under the local ordinance, and the 
court said that there would be no liability for damages.642 
The court concluded that “the defendant was fully justified in killing 
the dog under the circumstances, upon common law principles” of neces-
sity.643  The dog was a dangerous and unruly animal, and yet his owner per-
mitted him to run at large.644  The public safety demanded that something 
be done.645  In addition, the dog had been bitten by a mad dog and may well 
have had a contagious disease that would further jeopardize the citizens.646 
3. Cases Involving Destruction or Harm to Property by Police in 
Apprehending Criminal Suspects 
Numerous state courts have refused to grant compensation when pri-
vate property is damaged or destroyed as a result of police action in the 
course of apprehending criminal suspects.647  The reasoning is that the 
 
635. Id. 
636. 13 Johns. 312 (N.Y. Sup. 1816). 










647. See, e.g., Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento, 895 P.2d 900, 923 (Cal. 1995), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1116 (1996); Patel v. United States, 823 F. Supp. 696, 699 (N.D. Cal. 1993); 
Bray v. Houston County, 348 S.E.2d 709, 710-11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986); McCoy v. Sanders, 148 
S.E.2d 902, 906 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966); Ind. State Police v. May, 469 N.E.2d 1183, 1184 (Ind. Ct. 
      
2007] VIOLATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 729 
damage is not a taking, but rather a tort, and in turn the aggrieved party 
frequently cannot recover under a tort claim unless there is evidence of 
unreasonable governmental activity.648  Essentially, the courts find a 
“public necessity” exception to justify non-compensation,649 a position that, 
as mentioned in Section III.B., is affirmed by the Restatement. 
Customer Co. v. City of Sacramento,650 involved the police’s use of 
tear gas to apprehend a criminal who had taken refuge in a liquor store.  The 
owner of a convenience store sued under the state constitution’s “Just 
Compensation” clause to recover damage to his store and its contents 
caused when police acted to apprehend a suspect who had taken refuge in 
the building.651  The damage occurred when police launched twelve or thir-
teen tear gas canisters into the building, causing property damage in excess 
of $275,000, which included “nearly $90,000 in contaminated inventory, 
approximately $150,000 to dispose of this hazardous waste, and over 
$18,000 to repair the building and fixtures.”652  The California Supreme 
Court held, over a vigorous dissent, that the property of the store owner was 
not taken for a “public use,” but that the use benefited a particular 
individual.653 
The court stated that “law enforcement officers must be permitted to 
respond to emergency situations that endanger public safety, unhampered 
by the specter of constitutionally mandated liability for [the] resulting 
damage to private property and by the ensuring potential for disciplinary 
action.”654  The court further stated that “it is a specific application of the 
general rule that damage to, or even destruction of, property pursuant to a 
valid exercise of the police power often requires no compensation under the 
just compensation clause.”655  According to the court, the plaintiff might 
have a remedy under the state’s Tort Claims Act, if negligence could be 
proven and certain immunity provisions did not apply to the police conduct, 
but not under the state’s “Just Compensation” clause.656 
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Wegner v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co.657 involved a similar situation.658  
A fleeing suspect took refuge in the plaintiff’s residence.659  Police sur-
rounded the house and, when the suspect ignored orders to surrender, fired 
tear gas and “flash-bang” grenades into the house.660  As a result, they 
captured the suspect, but caused damage to the plaintiff’s home in the 
amount of $71,000.661 
The Minnesota court seemed motivated by a sense of fundamental 
fairness, in refusing to allow the city to defend the claim based on public 
necessity: 
We believe the better rule, in situations where an innocent third 
party’s property is taken, damaged or destroyed by the police in 
the course of apprehending a suspect, is for the municipality to 
compensate the innocent party for the resulting damages. . . .  At 
its most basic level, the issue is whether it is fair to allocate the 
entire risk of loss to an innocent homeowner for the good of the 
public.  We do not believe the imposition of such a burden on the 
innocent citizens of this state would square with the underlying 
principles of our system of justice.662 
Wallace v. City of Atlantic City663 involved damage to apartment doors 
caused by a police drug raid.  The court held that the government should 
bear the costs because the damage was incurred for the benefit of the 
public.664  The court relied on the “intended beneficiary” test of the YMCA 
case, which was discussed in Section III.C., noting that in this case the 
“particular intended beneficiary was the public, rather than a private 
individual, [thus] compensation [is] warranted.”665 
In Steele v. City of Houston,666 escaped prisoners took refuge in plain-
tiff’s house.667  In order to capture the escapees, police set fire to the house, 
destroying it and its contents.  The Texas Supreme Court concluded that the 
residence was taken “for the public use . . . by proof that the City ordered 
the destruction of the property because of real or supposed public 
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emergency to apprehend armed and dangerous men who had taken refuge in 
the house.”668  Here the court seemed to take on the YMCA “intended 
beneficiary” approach by suggesting the police action was for the safety of 
the public rather than for a private individual. 
The court also recognized the traditional emergency exception to 
claims for just compensation by stating: “The defendant City of Houston 
may defend its actions by proof of a great public necessity.  Mere con-
venience will not suffice.”669  The court then seemed to ignore this com-
ment in saying, in the next paragraph, that the property owner was entitled 
to compensation, without a determination whether the police were 
responding to an emergency: “We do not hold that the police officers 
wrongfully ordered the destruction of the dwelling; we hold that the inno-
cent third parties are entitled by the [Texas] Constitution to compensation 
for their property[,]”670 and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. 
The Wegner, Wallace and Steele opinions do not represent the weight 
of authority.  Almost every other court that has considered the question has 
denied compensation for damages caused by reasonable police conduct in 
apprehending criminal suspects. 
In Blackman v. City of Cincinnati,671 the owner of an automobile sued 
to recover damages resulting when a police officer entered plaintiff’s auto-
mobile and ordered him to pursue a vehicle containing fleeing suspect.672  
Plaintiff’s car was damaged during the chase when it collided with parked 
truck.  The Ohio Supreme Court denied a claim for compensation under the 
“Takings Clause” of the Ohio Constitution, saying that this provision was 
not intended to apply to personal property such as an automobile.673 
In Indiana State Police v. May,674 police fired tear gas into the 
plaintiff’s home to capture a felony suspect who had taken refuge there, and 
compensation for the damages was denied. 
In McCoy v. Sanders,675 a landowner sued under the “Takings Clause” 
of the Georgia Constitution for damages that resulted when police drained 
his pond (killing all the fish, and damaging the pond) to search for a murder 
victim.676  The court stated that “[u]nder certain circumstances and 
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conditions, a municipality may, acting under its police power for the 
general welfare of the public, take or use the property of a person or 
corporation without paying compensation therefor.”677 
And, in Patel v. United States,678 the court denied compensation when 
police, in executing an arrest warrant, fired smoke grenades, tear gas and 
flash grenades into plaintiff’s residence, causing fire that destroyed 
residence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts have been vigilant in upholding the privilege of necessity, both 
public and private, in connection with the invasion of property rights in 
order to avert a greater evil.  However, the question of compensation has 
been somewhat case-specific.  Many of the results seem intuitive, while 
others seem unfair. 
In cases of private necessity, there is a kind of anomaly in the law: 
agents can be obligated to pay compensation to those who suffer loss at 
their hands even though it was permissible to have caused that loss.  This 
anomaly seems based on the intuitive sense that as between the individuals 
concerned, it is fair that the one whose interests are advanced by the act 
should bear the cost of harm done in the process, rather than imposing the 
loss on one who derives no benefit from the act.  This principle has been 
criticized.  Phillip Montague, for example, argues that only a wrongful act 
can give rise to a duty to compensate, so one who is driven by necessity to 
harm another’s property ought not owe compensation.679 
When an act of private necessity is non-negligent and involuntary, as in 
some of the aircraft emergency landing situations examined in this article, 
the injured party is not entitled to compensation.  This result has been criti-
cized, for “[t]he person who finds her body or property damaged will find it 
little consolation that her injurer acted without fault.  (In fact, she will in a 
pragmatic sense find in that situation a greater wrong to herself, since our 
present tort system will allow her no compensation at all.)”680 
The infringement of property rights in situations of public necessity 
does not carry with it an obligation to pay compensation, even though often 
enough the material harm is greater than with acts of private necessity (e.g., 
blowing up a bridge to prevent enemy troops from gaining an advantage, or 
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burning down a house to flesh out a criminal suspect).  In both instances the 
doctrine of necessity justifies the action.  However, in the case of public 
necessity the explanation for not requiring compensation appears to rest on 
the idea that the actor who performs an act of public necessity thereby 
averts a public calamity; the actor as such gains no personal advantage from 
the situation, but the public at large does, while in situations of private 
necessity the actor or some other individual has benefited, not the public at 
large.  Thus, it would be unfair to impose a duty of compensation on one 
who acts to avert a public disaster. 
To the extent an aggrieved party is not legally entitled to compensation 
for the material harm resulting due to public necessity, there is nonetheless 
a moral obligation to provide compensation, either through ad hoc statutory 
enactments, or by broad statutory schemes.  As President Grant stated in his 
veto message, mentioned in Part III.C, “[i]f a government makes compensa-
tion under such circumstances, it is a matter of bounty rather than of strict 
legal right.”681  In those situations of public necessity where compensation 
has in fact been awarded, as where the property was taken by the military 
for later use, or where there has been unnecessary destruction of property, 
courts have been careful to note that the theory of compensation is based on 
implied promise in contract law, rather than on the Takings Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment. 
Just what constitutes a necessitous circumstance and a reasonable 
choice between two evils is something that varies from time and place, and 
juries are entitled to assess the necessity doctrine according to evolving 
standards.  In this regard, George Washington once wrote: “[W]hat is some-
times good may at other times be evil, and what is sometimes wrong may 
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